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DISABILITY AND WELFARE REFORM:
KEEP THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY
INCOME PROGRAM BUT REENGINEER
THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS
Gay Gellhorn*
I. Introduction
In comparison to the rather noisy discussion about the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program and teenage mothers,'
the welfare reform debaters are quieter about the Supplemental
Security Income program2 and the disabled children and adults it
assists. For twenty years, impoverished adults and children who
are totally and permanently disabled, and therefore "unable to en-
gage in any substantial gainful activity,"3 have depended on this
* Professor, District of Columbia School of Law; Director, Public Entitlements
Clinic. Natalie Wasserman, Esq., ably assisted with the research for this Article. I
would like to express my appreciation to my father, Walter Gellhorn, University Pro-
fessor Emeritus, Columbia University School of Law, and to the Honorable James L.
Oakes, now Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, who taught me the importance of keeping a watchful and constructive eye on
administrative agencies charged with responsibility for our most vulnerable citizens.
I am grateful to the Social Security Administration Office of Hearings and Appeals
and the Washington, D.C., Disability Determination Service, in particular Daniel Sko-
ler, Marianne Julian, Michael Brennan and Michael Billingsley of those offices, for
providing data and comments. All social security advocates are indebted to Ethel
Zelenske and Kim Savage, National Senior Citizens Law Center, for their Informa-
tional Mailings. Finally, I appreciate the collegial comments of Michael A. Schuster
and Dorothy Siemon, Legal Counsel for the Elderly, and Prof. Susan L. Waysdorf,
DCSL.
1. The primary focus of the debate on welfare reform is on the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program ("AFDC"), see infra note 27, but there are voices
calling for elimination of all means-tested programs as the cure to perpetuating the
cycle of dependence on government. The Cato Institute, for example, calls the Sup-
plemental Security Income program "the black-hole of the welfare state." Testimony
of Stephen Moore, Director of Fiscal Studies, Cato Institute, Before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human Resources (Jan. 27, 1995). An-
other Cato Institute writer lists sixty-three "major" means-tested programs (including
SSI), and argues that the entire social welfare system should be eliminated "for indi-
viduals able to work." Michael Tanner, Ending Welfare As We Know It, 212 POLICY
ANALYSIS 4 n.9, 23 (July 7, 1994). This Article is concerned with the protected cate-
gory of persons unable to work because of disability.
2. Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, Title XVI of
the Social Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83d (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
See infra discussion at part II.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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federal entitlements program for survival. Some 4.6 million dis-
abled persons are entitled to benefits that average $381 a month.4
The Social Security Administration ("SSA") estimates that 2.9 mil-
lion people will file new disability claims in fiscal year 1995.5 That
number will surely increase if Congress enacts legislation eliminat-
ing or restricting other entitlement programs, particularly as states
cut back their welfare programs.6 Even in current times, when the
"safety net" is woven out of many programs, some 40% of Supple-
mental Security Income applicants had applied for or were receiv-
ing other state-administered benefits the year preceding their
application for Supplemental Security Income.7 A comprehensive
4. 57 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 129, tbl. 2.A9 (Fall 1994) (reporting June 1994 data).
The Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") program also provides benefits for the
very poor who are aged or blind; those programs are not within the scope of this
Article. The recipients in June 1994, included 4,621,570 disabled persons, 1,470,240
aged persons and 85,735 blind persons. The total average monthly benefit for all SSI
recipients in June 1994 was $347.28. Id.
5. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,900 (1994). This represents a 69% increase over fiscal year
1990 levels. Id.
6. After Michigan terminated its welfare program in October 1991, there was an
unusual increase in SSI enrollments. Between 1989 and 1990, SSI recipients in Michi-
gan increased by 6466; between December 1990 and December 1991, the increase was
10,818, and the following year the increase was 20,337. Soc. SECURITY BULL., AN-
NUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 1989 (tbl. 9.B3); 1990 (tbl. 9.B3); 1991 (tbl. 7.B3);
1992 (tbl. 7.B3).
Most states are cutting back on their welfare programs. See Malcolm Gladwell, Re-
making Welfare: In States' Experiments, a Cutting Contest, WASH. PosT, Mar. 10, 1995,
at Al, A4 (discussing experience of some of the forty-four states that have enacted
legislation changing their welfare systems, and the competition among states "to find
out who can do the best job of driving the poor out of their state or keep them from
coming in."). An example is Virginia. Spencer S. Hsu & Donald P. Baker, Va. Over-
hauls Welfare, Gives Allen a Victory, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1995, at Al, A20 (74,000
women and their children to be affected by new law providing no payments to addi-
tional children born to. welfare mothers; teenage mothers to live with parents and
identify fathers; work requirement within 90 days of receiving first check; end of ben-
efits in two years).
7. SSA refers to a "recent" study that showed that 40% of claimants filing for SSI
disability benefits had filed for or received AFDC, welfare, or other state social serv-
ices within the year preceding the SSA study. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,900 (1994). About
three quarters of these claimants had been granted other benefits, and three quarters
of those beneficiaries were still receiving them at the time they applied for federal
disability benefits. Id. Nineteen percent of AFDC recipients have a disability, accord-
ing to Deborah Weinstein, Director, Family Income Division, Children's Defense
Fund (3/1/95) (transcript on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
The incentives have been there to move clients from state welfare programs such as
General Public Assistance to the federal Supplemental Security Income program.
The local government's incentive has been improved cash flow and reduced welfare
costs; as each state recipient of benefits moves on to the SSI rolls, the federal govern-
ment both "repays" the state for benefits paid out to that recipient during any concur-
rent periods of coverage, 20 C.F.R. § 416.1901-22 (1994) (interim assistance
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discussion of welfare reform must therefore include review of the
Supplemental Security Income program.
Congress enacted the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI")
program in 1972 to provide a uniform, federally-funded program to
guarantee a monthly income to the poor and disabled.8 Congress,
with the urging of a Republican President, was responding to a per-
ceived need to "overhaul" existing, disparate state programs "to
improve their adequacy, their equity, and their efficiency,"9 as well
as to protect the wage-related social security program.10 Supple-
mental Security Income is an entitlement program for three groups
of poor people: the disabled (the group with which this Article is
concerned), the aged and the blind. Persons in each of these
groups may also be covered by the Social Security Act. What dis-
tinguishes the two programs is their non-disability requirements.
Eligibility for Social Security disability benefits (often referred to
as Social Security Disability, "DI" or Title II) requires proof of "in-
sured status" for those who have paid into the social security sys-
tem through their FICA taxes on their earned income."1 Eligibility
for Supplemental Security Income (often referred to as "SSI" or
Title XVI) requires proof of limited income and resources.' 2 Only
agreements), and also assumes the future costs of the disability benefits. The claim-
ant's incentive has been higher monthly checks. An individual AFDC recipient in the
District of Columbia, for example, receives $265 a month. A D.C. disabled SSI recipi-
ent, on average, receives $375, up to a maximum of $458. 57 Soc. SECURITY BULL.
129, tbl. 2.A9 (Fall 1994) (SSI statistics for June 1994).
8. The Social Security Amendments of 1972 became effective in 1974. Pub. L.
No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d). The
implementing regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 (Title II) and 416 (Title
XVI). Part 404 Subpart P, Appendices 1 (the "Listings" of disabling impairments)
and 2 (the vocational-medical guidelines, or "Grids"), apply to disability determina-
tion under both SSI and Social Security Disability. Supplemental Security Income
was enacted after Congress failed to pass legislation guaranteeing all persons an in-
come floor. 57 Fed. Reg. 40,746 (1992).
9. Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security, March 31, 1971, reprinted
in Soc. SECURITY BULL. 6, 17-18 (June 1971). It is ironic that Congress two decades
ago concluded that the existing "crazy quilt" of state programs and federal-state part-
nerships didn't work, id., while the current Congress seeks to return welfare programs
to the states and limit federal financial and administrative involvement.
10. Id. at 18. The rhetoric offered then was not dissimilar to the rhetoric advanced
by Republicans now. President Nixon, for example, supported the legislation as a
companion piece to his proposals for work incentive programs such as earned income
tax credits, workfare, and national wage supplements to "spur, rather than kill, the
incentive to start working and keep on earning." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 270, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 413-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.110-.146 (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 20 C.F.R. § 416.202(4)(c)-(d)
(1994); pt. 416 subpts. D, K and L.
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the very poor meet the Social Security Act's financial tests for SSI:
resources and assets of no more than $2000 for a single person, and
income no more than the maximum $458 SSI monthly benefit.
Contrary to a popular stereotype of the SSI recipient as a
nonworker, a great many of these very poor SSI recipients have
work histories that entitle them to social security benefits.13 Over
40% of those who receive SSI also receive social security
benefits.14
The standard for disability, and the process for determining disa-
bility, are identical for the Supplemental Security Income program
and for the Social Security Disability program. Claimants must
prove that they are:
unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months (or, in the case of a child under the age of 18, if
he suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of comparable severity). 5
For persons who meet this definition of disability-the disabled
and unemployed-health insurance is a critical issue. They face
high health care costs, and may be inadequately insured or barred
from access to private insurance because of their preexisting condi-
tions. Because current national policy does not include universal
health care coverage, some disabled persons can only hope to ob-
tain medical care if they prove that they are unable to work be-
cause of their disabilities, and thus qualify for Medicaid or
Medicare.1 6 Health care reform is integral to the discussion of wel-
fare programs and policy. 7
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a), 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100-.1182 (1994).
14. Many people receive social security disability or retirement benefits less than
the maximum amount allowed under the SSI program. If they also have limited re-
sources, they are eligible for SSI, which is reduced by the amount of their other in-
come, including social security. In 1994, 40.1% of all SSI recipients also received
Social Security benefits. Soc. SECURITY BULL., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
296, tbl. 7.D (1994). The figure for disabled SSI recipients was 32%; for elderly SSI
recipients it was 64%. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(i)(A).
16. Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries automatically receive Medicaid;
Medicare covers DI beneficiaries beginning twenty-nine months after the onset of
disability.
17. At the request of the Chairpersons of the Committee on Ways and Means and
the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House of Representatives in March 1993,
the nonprofit National Academy of Social Insurance ("NASI") is examining the rela-
tionship of health care insurance and public disability programs. NASI, RETHINKING
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A finding of disability under the SSI program does not confer
lifetime benefits.18 The federal disability program has provisions
for rehabilitation and encourages the disabled to undertake a plan
to become self-supporting. 19 Also, disability recipients are subject
to periodic case reviews to redetermine continuing eligibility.20
The Supplemental Security Income program is not lavish. The
maximum monthly SSI payment to an individual in 1995 is $458;
this amount may be less, depending on the recipient's countable
income and living arrangements.2' The maximum payment is only
75% of the poverty guidelines for an individual.22 Nevertheless,
the program has been effective since its inception in closing the
poverty gap for the vulnerable population of disabled adults and
children. Comparison of the pre-SSI poverty gap in 1973 with the
subsequent year under SSI showed that, in its first year, SSI elimi-
nated 60% of the preexisting poverty gap for the disabled.2 3 An-
other statistical study a decade later analyzed 1990 data on the
DISABILITY POLICY: THE ROLE OF INCOME, HEALTH CARE, REHABILITATION AND
RELATED SERVICES IN FOSTERING INDEPENDENCE 118, 130-32 (Preliminary Status
Report Mar. 1994)(on file with author) (available from NASI, 1776 Mass. Avenue,
N.W., Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036-1904, phone: (202) 452-8097).
18. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1701-.1715 (1994).
19. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1180-.1181 (1994)(describing Plan to Achieve Self Support
("PASS")). SSA will continue SSI payments to a person with an approved PASS plan
for up to forty-eight months and disregard income used in the plan, such as income
used for postgraduate education.
20. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.989-.990, 416.204 (1994). Congress has mandated continuing
disability reviews every three years unless the disability is permanent, but has not
provided sufficient resources for SSA to comply.
21. 20 C.F.R. pt. 416 subpt. D (1994).
22. Nat'l Sr. Citizens L. Center, Informational Mailing 95-1 (Jan. 20, 1995) (on file
with author)(available from NSCLC, 1815 H St., NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC
20006, phone: (202) 887-5280, FAX: (202) 785-6792). For a disabled couple, SSI pays
benefits at 90% of the poverty guidelines. Id. In 1990, the federal SSI payment for an
eligible individual was 74% of the poverty threshold. 57 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 28
(1994).
The Census Bureau sets the poverty "threshold," the official definition of poverty
for statistical purposes. 57 Fed. Reg. 40,747,(1992). The Dept. of Health & Human
Services poverty "guidelines" are "a simplification of the poverty threshold for ad-
ministrative purposes." Id.
While some politicians are moving to decrease spending on welfare, the American
Bar Association in February 1994, adopted Resolution 109A, which urged Congress
to increase SSI benefits from 75% to 120% of poverty guidelines, to allow higher
resource levels for eligibility and to eliminate counting in-kind support as income.
23. Sylvester J. Schieber, First Year Impact of SSI on Economic Status of 1973
Adult Assistance Populations, 1978 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 18, 26, reprinted in 51 Soc.
SECURITY BULL. 19, 27 (1988). In some states, the impact of replacing the state pro-
gram with the federal SSI program was even more pronounced. In California, for
instance, the SSI program in 1994 eliminated 96% of the 1973 (pre-SSI) poverty in-
come shortfall for the disabled. Id. at 33, 34.
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impact of the federal benefits program on the poverty status of
children. 4 Although the percentage of children in families with
income under the poverty threshold had climbed to an alarming
22% in 1992, the number would have been vastly higher without
the payment of federal social security and SSI benefits. These pro-
grams raised 1.1 million children above the poverty level and less-
ened the effects of poverty for 1.3 million more. 5
Although the SSI program accomplishes its objective of support-
ing persons whose disabilities prevent them from supporting them-
selves through work, the program is vulnerable because it costs a
great deal-some $19 billion in cash benefits in 199426-and be-
cause its processes are complex and poorly understood and grind
extremely slowly. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are
major proposals to change the Supplemental Security Income enti-
tlement program. The Republican-majority House of Representa-
tives began the 104th Congress by introducing a variety of bills
promised in the pre-election Contract With America, which made a
broad promise to "cut spending for welfare programs and... pro-
mote individual responsibility" through a piece of legislation to be
called the Personal Responsibility Act. 7 Introduced early in the
session as H.R. 4, the Personal Responsibility Act's primary focus
was on turning welfare over to the states, limiting welfare to teen-
24. John R. Kearney et al., The Influence of Social Security Benefits and SSI Pay-
ments on the Poverty Status of Children, 57 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 19, 27 (1994). In
part as a result of landmark litigation successfully challenging the SSA's evaluation
process for children's disability claims, Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), the
level of children's claims has risen dramatically, from 11% of all SSI claims in 1988 to
21% of all SSI claims in 1992. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,900 (1994); see also Kearney et al.,
supra, at 28 (discussing impact of Zebley case).
25. Kearney et al., supra note 24, at 30 & tbl. 5 (1990 data). Supplemental Secur-
ity Income benefits alone moved over 322,000 children out of poverty. Id. If OASDI
and SSI benefits had not been received in 1990, the number of children in families
living below 50% of the poverty line would have been four times greater than the
approximately 400,000 in this category. Id. An additional 1.3 million children were in
families that remained below the poverty line, but whose income was raised above
50% of that line by the receipt of OASDI and SSI benefits. Id.
26. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: FEDERAL DISABIL-
ITY PROGRAMS FACE MAJOR IssUEs tbl. 1 at 4 (Mar. 2, 1995) (GAO/T-HEHS-95-97).
In 1994, the federal government paid SSI benefits to 893,000 disabled children and
2,311,000 disabled or aged adults. Id
27. GOP's Contract With America, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 1994, at 14A. As
noted, supra note 1, the primary target of this proposal was teenage mothers. The
Personal Responsibility Act was described in the Contract With America as follows:
"'Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor
mothers and denying increased AFDC for [mothers having] additional children while
on welfare, cut spending for Welfare programs and enact a tough two-years-and-out
provision with work requirements to promote individual responsibility.'" Id.
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age mothers, and requiring AFDC recipients to work.28 Various
versions of the Personal Responsibility Act emerged from commit-
tees and coalesced in a bill that passed the House of Representa-
tives on March 24, 1995.29 This final bill would limit SSI eligibility
for certain classes of recipients, including most legal aliens, chil-
dren, and persons who are disabled primarily because of drug
abuse or alcoholism. 3° The Clinton Administration, in testimony
presented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, op-
posed much of the proposed legislation.3a
-Against this backdrop of legislative assault, the Social Security
Administration, now an independent entity, 32 assumes that the en-
titlement program will continue and that Congress's definition of
"disabled" will remain unchanged. The agency, however, has ar-
ticulated the urgent need to alter its disability determination pro-
cess with a goal of reaching correct decisions on initial claims,
rather than through a complex process of multiple appeals.33 The
Social Security Administration's primary focus at this moment is
on procedural, not substantive change. To this end, the agency re-
cently released a Process Reengineering Program: Disability Reen-
gineering Project Plan ("Reengineering Plan")' to save money,
28. Among its less-publicized provisions was termination of SSI as an entitlement
program, instead capping the federal expenditure at 1995 levels adjusted for inflation
and the growth in the poverty population. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301(b)(2),
302(2) (as introduced Jan. 4, 1995).
29. H.R. 4. See infra discussion at part IV.
30. .L
31. Letter from Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health & Human Services, to E. Clay
Shaw, Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Committee on Ways
and Means (Feb. 13, 1995) (on file with author).
32. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464 (1994). This Act, in part, established the Social Secur-
ity Administration as a separate agency, effective March 31, 1995. The structure of
the independent SSA, for example a six-year term for the Secretary, is intended to
make SSA less vulnerable to political pressure. The President nominated the present
Commissioner, Shirley M. Chater, to head the new agency. She is committed to im-
plementing the Reengineering Plan discussed in this Article, infra part III.
33. The Social Security Administration states the "case for action" in 59 Fed. Reg.
47,889 (1994). The agency also cites the changes in demographics and technology.
34. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,887-940 (Sept. 19, 1994) (final version); Disability Reengineer-
ing Project Proposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,188-264 (Apr. 15, 1994) (first publication). See
infra discussion at part III. The National Performance Review, headed by Vice Presi-
dent Gore, directed SSA to improve its disability process. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,905
(describing reengineering technique). To do so, SSA adopted the reengineering con-
cept from corporate America. See MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAMPY, REEN-
GINEERING THE CORPORATION (1993) (advising management to collapse several jobs
into one, use computers to eliminate paperwork, and shift more decision-making
power to workers). Media reports indicate that enthusiasm for the influential book
"has begun to flatten out in the management world." Jay Matthews, The Little Reen-
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decrease delays in decision-making, and increase citizen and em-
ployee satisfaction. Thus, Congress and the Social Security Ad-
ministration are moving on separate tracks.
The thesis of this Article is that reform of the Supplemental Se-
curity Income disability program is properly on the welfare reform
agenda, but not in the terms cast by proposed legislation. Proce-
dural reform targeting identified problems should be the first step,
rather than the termination of the federal entitlement program or
the re-writing of the eligibility criteria. Substantive reform should
follow such procedural reform. Therefore, this Article will focus
particularly on procedural reform, although it will place that dis-
cussion in the context of the current legislative climate.
Part II of this Article describes the current disability determina-
tion process and why it needs to change. Part III discusses proce-
dural reform, and in particular the major aspects of the agency's
Reengineering Plan 35 and its implementation. 36 This Part also fo-
cuses attention on aspects of the Plan that deserve special vigilance
and proactive participation by those who advocate on behalf of
poor and disabled people. Part IV reviews current congressional
proposals to restrict the reach of the SSI program. The Article ar-
gues for rejection of these proposals, which are not responsive to
the identified need for change in the system, and which would have
untoward and destructive impacts on state and local governments
and the people whose survival depends on these entitlements. The
Article concludes that the Reengineering Plan holds promise for
procedural reform of a major welfare program in ways that will be
beneficial to citizens.
II. Disability Determination: A Process in Need of Change
Disability determination has to change. The process costs too
much and takes too long: agency graphs show rising claims,37 rising
gine That Can't Always, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at B10. Champy notes that man-
agement needs to respond to employees' fear for their future as it forces some out and
others to change assignments and assume new responsibility. Id. at B12.
35. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,887-940 (1994).
36. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PUB.
No. 01-006, DISABILITY PROCESS REDESIGN: NEXT STEPS IN IMPLEMENTATION (Nov.
1994)[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN] (on file with author). SSA has not pub-
lished the Implementation Plan in the Federal Register. A copy is on file with the
author, and can be obtained from SSA by phone, (410) 966-8255.
37. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,890-91 (1994). SSA estimates 2.9 million initial disability
claims in fiscal year 1995, a 69% increase over FY 1990 levels, and 542,000 requests
for hearings before an Administrative Law Judge, a 75% increase over FY 1990
levels. Id. at 47,900.
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costs, 38  decreased staff,39 increased backlogs 40  and increased
processing times.4 1 Adjudication is based in part on rules that have
not been adopted by notice-and-comment rulemaking.4 2 The in-
centives in the present system are skewed; the present system re-
wards both the government and claimants' representatives for
delay, at the expense of claimants,43 and encourages outcomes that
may not reflect the merits of cases." Although the system accom-
plishes its purpose of sustaining millions of very poor, disabled
people, it does so at costs that are unacceptable to nearly every-
one. From the claimants' point of view, there is a crisis of confu-
sion and delay. They do not understand how to navigate the
system successfully, why it takes so long and why different levels of
the same agency reach opposite conclusions. As to delay, persons
who meet the SSA standards of poverty45 can scarcely afford to
wait for help. Yet the agency takes from five months to two years
to determine that they are unemployed because of physical and/or
mental impairments. The actual task time for SSA staff during this
extended period is minuscule: thirteen hours of the 154 days from
initial application to initial decision, for example, and only thirty-
two hours of the 342 days from a request for a hearing to receipt of
a hearing decision if the claimant has appealed unfavorable deci-
38. Id. at 47,892 (disability beneficiary growth). In fiscal year 1993, SSA spent
$2.5 of its $4.9 billion administrative cost budget for processing disability applications
and appeals. Id. at 47,896-97. The figure includes the costs of processing disability
ipplications under both the SSI and the Social Security Disability programs. 57 Soc.
SECURITY BULL. 51, 52 (1994).
39. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,893-95 (1994).
40.. The backlog of cases awaiting a hearing before one of the agency's approxi-
mately 800 Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), for example, recently passed the
half million mark. Even when ALJs issue an average of forty-four decisions a month,
they cannot keep abreast of new filings or eliminate the backlog. Interview with
Daniel Skoler, Associate Commissioner and Chief of the Office of Hearings and Ap-
peals (Dec. 13, 1994); see also Christine M. Moore, SSA Disability Adjudication in
Crisis!, 33 JUDGES' JOURNAL 2, 6, 46 n.1 (Summer 1994) (projecting backlog of
563,000 in 1996).
41. 59 Fed. Reg. at 47,898-99 (1994). SSA projects for 1995 that the average
processing time for initial claims will be 154 days, about double the time required in
1988, and that time from request for an ALJ hearing to disposition will rise from
about 220 days to about 342 days. Id. at 47,899-900.
42. See infra discussion at parts II.B, III.B.
43. See infra discussion at parts II.C.1-2.
44. See infra discussion at part II.C.3.
45. That is, an unemployed person with less than $2000 in assets and resources and
countable monthly income of less than the SSI maximum benefit amount ($458 in
1995).
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sions to that level.46 During the rest of the time, files move from
desk to desk, travel between offices in different locations, are
stacked in the in-box47 or are simply lost. 8 To comprehend this
requires understanding the agency's multilayered decision-making
process, its lack of uniform standards for decision-making, and its
system of incentives.
A. The Multilayered Administrative Process
The Social Security Administration may be unique among fed-
eral agencies in having four levels of administrative review. Fur-
ther, in contrast to the pyramidal judicial system, where very few
contested matters end up in court and only a small percentage go
to trial or are appealed, 49 a relatively small proportion of disap-
pointed disability claimants drop out of the appeals process.50 Fi-
nally, it is astounding that approximately 75% of claimants are
successful in getting benefits at the hearing level-that is, the third
time around, after the-agency has twice reviewed their claim and
twice denied it.
1. Deciding to Apply
A person who is poor and unable to work because of disability
may learn about the SSI program in a variety of ways. In most
states granting their own interim disability benefits, recipients will
be required to apply for SSI. Some learn of SSI through outreach
programs, their social networks or through contact with Social Se-
curity for other reasons. Some of their information may be errone-
46. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,900-902 (1994). Task time is "the time employees actually
devote to working directly on a claim." Id. at 47,902.
47. SSA refers to this as "hand offs" and "queues." Id. at 47,902.
48. Disability determination remains a cumbersome paper process. Reform is to-
tally dependent on system-wide innovations -that will permit receiving and processing
information electronically. SSA acknowledges that its entire plan to redesign the dis-
ability determination process is dependent on its planned IWS/LAN environment and
the automated disability claim system, scheduled for pilot implementation in March
1996. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at 6; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DECENTRALIZED COM-
PUTER STRATEGY: ISSUES AND OPTIONS (1994).
49. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1994 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR,
app. 1, tbl. C-4 at A-36 (3.5% of civil cases filed in federal district courts during twelve
months ending Sept. 30, 1994 proceeded to trial).
50. Forty-eight percent of those denied benefits at the initial application stage re-
quest Reconsideration; 75% of those denied benefits at Reconsideration request a
hearing. 59 Fed. Reg. at 47,902 (1994).
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ous or incomplete. 1 Studies indicate that the participation rate in
SSI by eligible persons remains low. For example, only half the
four million elderly persons living in poverty receive SSI, and par-
ticipation varies within this group depending on race, gender, age
and living arrangements. 2 SSA has experimented with outreach
projects in a variety of settings, ranging from hospital-based enroll-
ment for low birth weight babies to corrections facilities-based en-
rollment for terminally ill inmates in anticipation of their release
under state compassionate release laws. SSA relies heavily on its
toll-free phone number to make appointments for applications and
to explain the application process. It also relies on publications
that are available at its offices in English and Spanish. 3 Despite
the agency's efforts, the SSA application process is confusing and
often unsuccessful for disabled claimants. 4
2. Initial Applications
A person seeking disability benefits under either the insured so-
cial security program or the supplemental security income program
makes an application at one of 1300 local SSA offices.5 5 Most
claimants are not represented at the initial application stage. After
the claim is screened for eligibility criteria based on insured status
(for a Social Security Disability claim) or limited resources (for an
SSI claim) or both (for a concurrent claim), the local office for-
51. For example, claimants may'incorrectly believe that anyone with an HIV-posi-
tive diagnosis is eligible for SSI. Moreover, claimants are often unsure of what papers
are needed at the appointment.
52. Statement of Ethel Zelenske Before the House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways & Means at 5-6 (Jan. 27, 1995)(cit-
ing studies by General Accounting Office (GAO/PEMD-92-29 (June 1992)) and by
SHIELS ET AL., ELDERLY PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SUPPLEMEN-
TAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) PROGRAM, (U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services,
Contract No. HHS-1-86-0051, Final Report, Jan. 1990)).
53. SSA entered a consent decree in Cruz v. Califano, 78 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa.
1978), agreeing to provide Spanish-language cover notices and interpreters. Some
states provide other bilingual services.
54. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SO-
CIAL SECURITY CLIENT SATISFACTION 1994: CLIENT SUBGROUPS 3-5 (June 1994)
(OEI-02-92-00982) (disabled clients' satisfaction with SSA mail, phone, and office
contacts 68%, compared with 87% satisfaction for nondisabled clients).
55. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994). Claimants make appointments by calling SSA's
toll-free telephone number, (800) 772-1213. They can expect to wait-both to get
through to someone on the phone, and to be scheduled for the appointment, although
terminally ill people can ask for faster scheduling. Because of the wait, SSA has de-
clared that the effective date of application will be the date the claimant called to
request an appointment. Because SSI benefits can only be paid from the date of
application, this protected filing date is significant.
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wards the claim folder to the Disability Determination Service
("DDS").5 6 These are odd hybrids: state agencies that effectively
operate as SSA field offices, funded by SSA and following proce-
dures promulgated by SSA.57 The DDS has in-house physicians
who review the medical records and make recommendations to dis-
ability examiners. The DDS can also request consultative medical
and psychiatric examinations from outside physicians.
The disability decision is made by an adjudicative team consist-
ing of a disability specialist and a program physician, who is a DDS
medical or psychological consultant.58 It is unlikely that DDS adju-
dicators ever see a claimant.59 The standards used by the DDS in
determining disability are set forth in the Program and Operation
Manual System ("POMS"). The POMS are not easily accessible to
the public; the SSA permits claimants and their representatives to
make an appointment to photocopy relevant sections, but the
POMS are not available in law libraries or on computerized re-
search services. When the DDS makes a decision, the SSA Disa-
bility Quality Branch reviews a sample of the claims. Ninety-five
percent of this "sample" are DDS grants of benefits; only 5% are
denials. The initial process takes an average of 155 days,60 of which
only thirteen hours is task time.61 The most recent statistics indi-
cate that the DDS awards disability benefits in 31% of initial
claims.62
56. The local office also has authority to award "presumptive benefits" in specific
instances, such as full-blown AIDS and terminal cancer. 20 C.F.R. § 416.934 (1994).
Presumptive benefits can continue for up to six months while DDS evaluates the
claim and do not have to be repaid if the claim is ultimately denied.
57. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1601-.1694, 416.1001-.1094 (1994).
58. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1615(c), 416.1015(c) (1994).
59. DDS offices discourage claimant contact. In D.C., for example, DDS uses a
post office box, rather than a street address, is not listed as an occupant in its build-
ing's lobby information board and does not list its telephone number with the infor-
mation operator.
60. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994) (data based on SSA Office of Workforce Analysis
fiscal year 1993 Study). Sixteen to twenty-six employees handle the claim. Id. The
target level of processing at DDS is thirty-seven days for a Title II claim, and forty-
three days for a Title XVI claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1642 (1994).
61. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994).
62. DDS PERFORMANCE REPORT 3A (Jan. 1995) (allowance rate of 30.8% for first
five months of fiscal year)(data supplied by Office of Hearings and Appeals; copy on
file with author). The percentage of initial claims allowed has declined since the pre-
ceding fiscal year (33.7%, id.), and since publication of the Reengineering Plan, which
reported 39% allowances. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994). The advocacy community is
watching this decline with concern.
DISABILITY AND WELFARE REFORM
3. Reconsideration
If the DDS denies benefits, the file returns to the local office.
The claimant has sixty days to request a reconsideration. Forty-
eight percent of those denied benefits do appeal.63 The claimants
must submit a Reconsideration Disability Report stating how their
situation has changed since they first applied, and listing any new
hospitalizations, doctors, medications and the like. The file then
goes back to the DDS, which assigns a different team to review the
file and any new evidence. Again, DDS staff will likely never meet
the claimant, nor will most claimants have a representative. 6' The
DDS allows only 14% of claims on Reconsideration. 65 The time
from initial contact with the agency to a reconsideration decision is
approximately eight months.66 The regional Disability Quality
Branch reviews 100% of the allowed claims.67 The disability file
again travels back to the local office.
4. Hearing Before an Administrative Law Judge
If the DDS again denies benefits, 75% of the disappointed claim-
ants will request a hearing, which they must do within sixty days of
the denial. Again, they will fill out an updated disability report.
The local office then forwards the claims file to the nearest Office
of Hearings and Appeals ("OHA"). 68 There, it is taken apart and
reassembled in the exhibits format used by Administrative Law
Judges, 69  and is reviewed for any additional evidentiary
development.
Once at the hearing level, most claimants obtain representa-
tion.70 As in the preceding stages, the claimant may submit addi-
tional evidence. Some will request a decision on the record in
63. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994).
64. Only 46% of the claimants at the Reconsideration level are represented.
Statement of Michael Billingsley, Director of Quality Assurance, D.C. Disability De-
termination Service (Apr. 29, 1994).
65. Id.
66. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994). Up to thirty-six different employees will have han-
dled the claim by the end of the Reconsideration process. Id.
67. Billingsley, supra note 64. As SSA somewhat euphemistically puts it: "Review
of DDS decisions is heavily weighted toward allowances .... ." 59 Fed. Reg. 47,904
(1994).
68. There are 132 hearing offices. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994).
69. Id This labor-intensive process, called "pulling the file," will end in 1996
when OHA starts to receive a "standardized folder." SSA is initiating the new tool at
local offices and DDSs in April-May 1995.
70. Seventy-five percent are represented at the hearing. Id. at 47,902. Represent-
atives need not be attorneys. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1505(b) (1994).
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hopes of speeding up the process; about a quarter of the appeals at
this level are favorably disposed of without a hearing.'
Those who proceed to a hearing now have their first face-to-face
determination. Because the agency is not represented, hearings
are not considered adversarial. Administrative Law Judges, there-
fore, fill several roles. They serve as independent fact-finders in a
de novo adjudication, but they also are charged with representing
the interests of the agency and with developing the record.72 The
legal standards used by ALJs are the United States Constitution;
the Social Security Act, the Code of Federal Regulations and case
law precedent. The POMS applied by the DDS are not binding on
Administrative Law Judges.
The process from request for a hearing to receipt of a decision
takes an average of 345 days,73 of which only thirty-two hours is
task time.74 Administrative Law Judges currently rule in favor of
claimants in an average of 75% of the claims decided on the
merits. 75
71. Memorandum from Marianne Julian, SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals
(Mar. 3, 1995)(for the past six months, on average, 23-24% of total hearing disposi-
tions were made on the record) (on file with author). Recently, SSA has been flag-
ging cases likely to be reversed according to various computer-generated profiles.
Screening units at OHA review these and may be able to issue a fully favorable "mod-
ified reconsideration" decision, thus avoiding a hearing. Presentation by Rita Geier,
Deputy Associate Comm'r, SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals (Mar. 13, 1995).
OHA is also expanding prehearing conferences, where senior OHA attorneys meet'
with claimants' representatives and, if possible, issue a modified reconsideration deci-
sion, or at least attempt to narrow the issues and develop the record for the hearing.
Id. Sixteen states have agreed to delegate DDS authority to OHA to develop- the
record and issue "revised" reconsideration decisions. Id. See discussion of Adjudica-
tion Officers, infra part III.D.
72. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1451 (1994). For a discussion of the difficulties faced by Ad-
ninistrative Law Judges wearing three hats, see Moore, supra note 40, at 41.
73. Interview with Marianne Julian, Administrative Assistant to Assoc. Comm'r
Daniel Skoler (Feb. 22, 1995) (based on date in SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals,
FIRST QUARTER REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1995 (Sept.-Dec. 1994)). The average
processing time in fiscal year 1994, which ended Sept. 30, 1994, was 300 days. FISCAL
YEAR 1994 ANNUAL REPORT. The average processing time is misleading because
approximately a quarter of the cases are decided without a hearing, see supra note 71
and accompanying text, thus skewing the data concerning those who wait for a
hearing.
74. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994).
75. Fiscal year 1994 national data supplied by SSA Office of Hearings and Ap-
peals. FISCAL YEAR 1994 ANNUAL REPORT at 2 (75.2% allowance rate for decided
cases, i.e., not counting dismissals) (on fie with author). As with Reconsideration
allowances, the percentage has declined since publication of the ReengineeringPlan.
Cf 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994) (77% allowances).
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5. Appeals Council
The hearing decision, however, is not the final decision of the
agency. The disappointed claimant may next seek review by the
SSA Appeals Council, which may also review cases on its own mo-
tion.76 Eighty-seven percent of disappointed claimants request re-
view by the Appeals Council.77 Although very few ALJ decisions
are reversed by the Appeals Council,78 its review yields a large
number of cases remanded to the ALJs,, who then grant benefits in
three-quarters of the remanded cases. 79 Nevertheless, this appeal
is a time-consuming step to establish exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Only after disposition by the Appeals Council, by which
time the claimant has been in the system for an average of two
years,80 may a claimant appeal to federal district court.
6. Judicial Review
Disappointed claimants proceed to federal district court for re-
view of unfavorable agency decisions in 20 to 25% of the cases.8'
In 1994, this translated into 3682 SSI appeals.82 At this point,
claimants must hire a lawyer or attempt to represent themselves;
their non-attorney representative cannot appear in federal court.
Judicial review is on the record. The applicable standards are the
United States Constitution, federal statutes, regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and the con-
trolling case law. Courts rule for claimants in approximately 8% of
76. The Appeals Council reviews about 18% of all hearing decisions, heavily
weighted toward denials. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994).
77. Letter of Chief Judge John F. Gerry, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, to Commissioner Shirley Chater (May 26,1994) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Gerry Letter].
78. The Appeals Council reverses in 3% of the cases, remands in 27%, and affirms
in 70%. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994). This results in approximately 18,000 awards of
benefits a year. In contrast with the Quality Assurance process for review of DDS
decisions, there is no systemic review process for hearing decisions. Id. at 47,904.
79. Remands resulted in approximately 15,000 allowances in fiscal year 1994.
Data supplied by Assoc. Comm'r Daniel Skoler, SSA OHA (Mar. 13, 1995). This was
three times the allowances that resulted from federal court review.
80. Id.
81. Memorandum from Marianne Julian, supra note 71 (20-25% appeal rate to
federal court in fiscal year 1994).
82. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 49, at app. 1, tbl. C-2 at
A-26. Figures are for the twelve months ending Sept. 30, 1994. In the same time
period, district courts terminated 3195 SSI cases, 2878 of them at the pretrial stage.
Id. at tbl. C-4 at A-37. The number of appeals to federal court has more than doubled
in the past four years. In 1990, claimants commenced 1770 SSI cases in federal district
court. Id. at tbl. C-2A at A-29.
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cases, and remand an additional 40% to the agency for further ad-
ministrative action, which often results in favorable decisions.8 3
7. Summary
In summary, SSA has four levels of administrative review of
claims for disability benefits: Initial Application, Reconsideration,
Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge and Appeals Council
review. Claimaints may seek review of the final adverse SSA ac-
tion in federal district court. On average, disabled persons seeking
subsistence benefits spend up to two years navigating the current
disability determination process before they are judged to be enti-
tled to SSI benefits. Although Social Security's Quality Assurance
reviews conclude that very high percentages of claims are correctly
decided at the first two levels of consideration, Administrative Law
Judges do not agree, and reverse the agency in approximately 75%
of the claims decided on the merits. As the next section discusses,
the disparity can be explained, in part, by the lack of uniform deci-
sion-making standards.
B. Lack of Uniform Standards for Decision-Making
A fundamental flaw calling for procedural reform is the lack of
uniform rules guiding decisions. While ALJs apply court precedent
and the Code of Federal Regulations, the local SSA offices and
state Disability Determination Services, which determine claims at
the application and reconsideration levels, follow the POMS, policy
guidelines not readily available outside the agency. The POMS is a
three-foot long loose-leaf binder of interpretive rules. SSA de-
scribes the POMS as "instructions which provide the substance of
the statute, regulations, and rulings in a structured format" supple-
mented by "other administrative issuances which clarify or elabo-
rate specific policy issues" promulgated by SSA and sent to the
fifty-four DDS offices. The public can make an appointment to
read or photocopy particular POMS, but claimants and many
claimants' representatives are unaware that the POMS even exists.
Often challenged in litigation as being inconsistent with the Social
Security Act and regulations,85 the POMS may add unknown hur-
dles for claimants. As SSA euphemistically puts it, the situation of
83. Data from SSA Litigation Staff, provided by Office of Hearings and Appeals
(Mar. 9, 1995) (on file with author).
84. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,919 (1994).
85. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) ("[T]he Claims Man-
ual is not a regulation. It has no legal force, and it does not bind the SSA.").
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two systems of adjudicative rules, one published and one internal
to the agency, "fosters the perception that different policy stan-
dards are used at different levels of decision-making in the claims
process. 8 6
The empirical basis for that perception is the disparity between
the quality assurance score for decisions made at the reconsidera-
tion and hearing levels. For example, the SSA regional quality as-
surance office scores the District of Columbia DDS as making
correct decisions in 97% of the cases it decides. If that judgment is
correct, one would expect approximately 3% reversals on appeal.
The actual reversal rate for these "correct" decisions at the D.C.
Office of Hearings and Appeals, however, is 70%, somewhat lower
than the national average of 77% reversals.87 One critic of the cur-
rent adjudicatory framework identifies as the "most glaring and ob-
vious source of the discrepancy" the fact that "administrative law
judges apply the statute, the regulations, and the case law, while
DDS applies the POMS."88 There are other explanations for the
disparity. The extended delay means that claimants will be older
and possibly sicker by the time of the hearing, when they can pres-
ent updated medical evidence. Also, because the hearing is the
first face-to-face determination, Administrative Law Judges can
clarify the record by questioning and simply observing the claim-
ant. The fact remains, however, that almost a quarter of the ap-
86. 59 Fed. Reg. 18,228 (1994).. "Perception" is clearly an understatement, be-
cause SSA states that decision-makers other than ALJs "are bound by interpretative
guidance in the Program Operations Manual System and supplemental issuances."
Id.
87. Statement of Michael Billingsley, supra note 64. The national reversal rate at
the Administrative Law Judge level is 77%. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (1994); see also Nat'l
Org. of Social Sec. Claimants' Representatives (NOSSCR), Different Conclusions of
Different Reviewers of ALJ and Reconsideration Decisions, 16 Soc. SECURITY FORUM
13-15 (1994) (summarizing Sept. 1994 report of the SSA Office of Program Integrity
and Review showing disparate conclusions as to whether decisions were supported by
substantial evidence when the decisions were reviewed by judges (81% of ALJ al-
lowances supported by substantial evidence) as compared to review by medical con-
sultants and disability examiners (only 41% so supported)) [hereinafter NOSSCR,
Different Conclusions]. The address for the NOSSCR is: National Organization of
Social Security Claimants' Representatives, Nancy G. Shor, Esq., Exec. Dir., 6 Pros-
pect St., Midland Park, NJ 07432, telephone: (201) 444-1415.
88. Moore, supra note 40, at 6-7. Christine Moore is a former SSA Administrative
Law Judge and chairs the Health and Benefits Committee of the National Conference
of Administrative Law Judges. Her article expresses the views of the National Con-
ference, which, in February 1994, adopted the recommendations appended to her arti-
cle. Id. at 46-47. The first recommendation is for a single standard for deciding
disability.
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pealed cases are disposed of on the record, prior to a hearing.8 9
The vast discrepancy between the results in initial decisions and
appeals makes the social security disability determination system
unique among appellate systems.90
C. The Incentive Structure of the Social Security Act
Federal laws and the disability determination process are now
structured with incentives that contribute to the problems of multi-
layered appeals and application of disparate standards which were
identified in the preceding sections. Additional budgetary re-
sources might be an answer to reducing delay. But a larger budget
is unlikely. Congress has steadily decreased the agency's appropri-
ation and staffing levels even in the face of rising numbers of claims
and increasing backlogs,91 and the agency intends to "downsize"
further. In addition to looking at ways to streamline its processes
to save time and money, Congress, SSA and advocates must look
at the incentive structure.
1. Government Incentives
Delay might be alleviated by changing the cost-benefit balance.
Presently, the government actually saves money, or at least does
not spend any additional money, when it delays decisions on
claims. For example, assume that an ALJ awards benefits two
years after a claimant first applied for benefits. SSA will then. be-
gin to pay out monthly benefits. SSA will also make a "lump sum"
payment covering the prior two-year period when the claimant
should have been receiving benefits. 92 The government pays no in-
terest on this lump sum back payment, so it does not compensate
claimants for the delay. Moreover, Congress has permitted the
agency to withhold future SSI payments if the lump sum is not
"spent down" within six months, on the ground that claimants who
89. See supra note 71.
90. Moore, supra note 40, at 4.
91. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,893-94 (1994). SSA staffing levels, expressed in work years,
decreased from over 80,000 in fiscal year 1983 to about 65,000 in fiscal year 1993.
DDS staff has remained fairly constant, but applications have increased from about
1.2 million to close to 2 million between fiscal years 1988 and 1993. Id. at 47,891.
92. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.535, 416.536, 416.543 (1994). When claimants receive state
benefits, they sign Interim Assistance Agreements with the state agreeing to apply for
SSI and to repay the state from any lump sum SSI payment they receive that covers
the same period as state benefits.
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receive such a payment are no longer "poor" because the lump
sum payment pushes them above the SSI resource level.93
Another incentive for government to make the right decision
quickly would arise if SSA were made responsible for attorney's
fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs. Congress has largely removed
this incentive for the SSA, which has no liability for attorney's fees
as a cost of making incorrect decisions at the administrative level.
Although Congress enacted a fee-shifting law-The Equal Access
to Justice Act ("EAJA")94 -to encourage the federal government
fo dct reasonably and make correct decisions at the administrative
level, Congress exempted the SSA from the provisions covering
fees for administrative proceedings. 95 Under EAJA, fees against
the SSA are recoverable only for work done on appeal to a federal
court. Thus, Congress removed a major incentive to improved
agency performance.
2. Representatives' Incentives
Congress also created financial incentives for advocates to assist
claimants late in the administrative process. The Social Security
Act allows claimants' representatives (who need not be attorneys)
to recover fees from the claimant for work undertaken at the
93. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1233 (1994). Claimants continue to receive their monthly
checks during the six months following payment of the lump sum, but if they have not
speht it down to the resource level required by the statute at that point, the agency is
entitled to withhold SSI checks until claimants become poor again.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). EAJA permits prevailing parties to
obtain attorney fees so long as the government's position was not substantially justi-
fied. See Gay Gellhorn, Equal Access to Justice Act Attorney's Fees, in DISABILITY:
SOCIAL SECURITY AND SSI PROGRAMS (Legal Counsel for the Elderly 1992 & Supp.
1994) (Michael Schuster & Dorothy Siemon, eds.).
95. When Congress enacted the EAJA in 1980, it disallowed fee-shifting to pre-
vailing parties in administrative proceedings in the Social Security Administration,
while allowing fees at the agency level elsewhere. The legislative history is explicit: to
sell EAJA, proponents traded off social security recipients' fee awards. H.R. REP.
No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 22 (1980) (noting in discussion of costs that exclud-
ing Social Security administrative adjudications from EAJA eliminated fees against
the government in 91% of 230,000 administrative adjudications in fiscal year 1978,
and noting further that "decision to award fees only in adversary adjudications re-
flects a desire to narrow the scope of the bill in order to make its costs acceptable").
When EAJA was reenacted in 1985, Congress did not extend its coverage to SSA
administrative proceedings. Sen. Heflin, who supported SSA coverage, stated that
the provision failed because of "institutional opposition." "While I believe this is an
area ripe for protection, political realities dictate otherwise. And this seems to be a
fight which will have to be fought another day." 1.31 CONG. REC. 20,350 (1985) (state-
ment of Sen. Heflin (D-Ala)).
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agency level.' Fees under the Act can be as large as 25% of the
claimant's lump sum award for back benefits.97 The representative
who puts twenty hours into successfully assisting a claimant at the
initial application stage is essentially engaged in pro bono work,
since the SSI claimant by definition has no resources with which to
pay a fee, and there is no past-due lump sum payment from which
to seek a fee under the Act. In contrast, a representative who puts
the same twenty hours into successfully assisting a claimant at the
hearing stage, after two years of delay, can expect to receive. a
fairly substantial fee. Thus, representatives, including attorneys,
may be financially precluded from assisting claimants early in the
disability determination process,98 and, indeed, may be said to ben-
efit from delay.99
3. Other Incentives
Yet another problem with the SSA disability determination
structure is the lack of incentives to settle cases that characterizes
most systems of dispute resolution. The SSA disability determina-
tion process requires a bright-line answer: for purposes of receiv-
ing SSI, claimants are either totally disabled or they are not
disabled at all. Other systems, notably Worker's Compensation,
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b), 1383(d)(2)(A) (1991 and Supp. 1995). Agency-approved
attorneys' fees will be paid directly from Social Security disability benefits (but not
from SSI) ultimately paid to the claimant. In April 1995, SSA announced that it
would "no longer approve fees, withhold benefits or pay attorneys because they are
not functions that are critical to our mission." Commissioner's Broadcast Message,
Announcement of SSA's Reinventing Government Phase II (REGO II) Initiatives
(Apr. 10, 1995) (on file with author).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b), 1383(d)(2)(A). If SSA awards benefits, the agency will
certify a representative's fee of the smallest of: 25% of the total amount of past-due
benefits (up to $4000); the amount of the fee approved by SSA; or the amount agreed
upon between the claimant and the attorney. Id. Most claimants retain a lawyer or
other representative for the hearing stage, but not before. The fee incentives en-
courage this delay.
98. In D.C., several major pro bono legal services providers have moved to early
intervention in claims, providing assistance at the initial application and reconsidera-
tion stages. The D.C. School of Law Public Entitlements Clinic, Whitman-Walker
AIDS Legal Clinic and the Judge David L. Bazelon Mental Health Law Center also
train volunteer lawyers in this strategy through the D.C. Bar pro bono training pro-
gram. The result for clients is awards of benefits within weeks (if the client meets the
criteria for presumptive disability) or months rather than years. By careful interview-
ing and comprehensive evidentiary development, the claimant's representative can
present a complete package at the time of the initial application.
99. It would be a violation of attorneys' rules of professional responsibility to de-
lay a proceeding improperly. The Reengineering Plan proposes to adopt standards
and sanctions applicable to misconduct committed by social security claimants' repre-
sentatives. See infra discussion at part III.G.
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evaluate percentages of disability. The only aspect of an SSI disa-
bility claim open to possible negotiation is the onset date of the
disability.
Additionally, the agency's Quality Assurance process may en-
courage line staff to reach decisions that will not be reviewed. At
the DDS level, review is heavily weighted toward cases in which
benefits were awarded; at the ALJ level there is no systematic re-
view of favorable decisions, but disappointed claimants are very
likely to appeal. 1°° Finally, advocates have an incentive, born of
experience, to keep appealing. Advocates know that Administra-
tive Law Judges reverse some 75% of the denials appealed to the
hearing level. The costs of case preparation are modest compared
with the likelihood of success on the merits.
In sum, the present disability determination system is beset by
problems caused by the sheer numbers of claims and resulting
backlogs of cases, by confusion in standards between the various
levels of administrative decision-making, and by incentive systems
that do not encourage change. The following Part describes and
analyzes the agency's proposals for responding to these problems
through procedural reforms.
III. The Social Security Administration's Reengineering
Proposal and Plan for Implementation
On March 31, 1994, the SSA announced a conceptual proposal
for a new disability claims process that not only holds promise for
fixing problems and better delivering services, but also offers
claimants' advocates an opportunity to influence changes in the de-
termination procedures. 101 The House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Social Security, held a hearing on the
proposal on April 14, 1994. After publication of the Disability
Reengineering Project Proposal in the Federal Register, 02 SSA re-
ceived over 6000 written comments, °3 as well as comments at a
100. See supra discussion at note 77.
101. The SSA and Congress are moving on separate tracks. For a discussion of the
House of Representatives disability welfare reform bill, which the author concludes is
not responsive to the identified need for changes, see infra part IV.
102. Disability Reengineering Project Proposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,188-264 (Dep't of
Health & Human Services, Soc. Security Admin.) (Apr. 15, 1994).
103. SSA extended the May 27 deadline for comments to June 14, 1994. 59 Fed.
Reg. 27,569 (1994). The agency received 6210 written comments from employees,
unions, professional associations, members of the public, claimants' representatives
and advocacy groups, physicians, state governors, and others. SSA summarized the
comments in a one-page Appendix to the revised proposal. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,940
(1994).
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variety of fora. The agency then published its revised Reengineer-
ing Plan in mid-September, 104 omitting some of the original propo-
sal. 05 In November 1994, the Social Security Administration
published Disability Process Redesign: Next Steps in Implementa-
tion,0 6 ("Implementation Plan"), a "living document"' 7 that SSA
plans to supplement as implementation of the Reengineering Plan
proceeds over the next six years. 10 8
The Reengineering Plan describes procedural reforms of the in-
take process, each of the existing levels of adjudication (including
new methods of evidentiary development and standards of deci-
sion-making), quality assurance, standards of professional respon-
sibility for claimants' representatives and electronic processing of
claims. Several of the proposals are particularly responsive to the
need for changes in the disability determination process identified
in Part II. These include changing the initial claims process, elimi-
nating the Reconsideration level of administrative review and cre-
ating a unified set of rules for use at all levels of adjudication rather
than the competing systems now in place. Additionally, the Plan
calls for creation of Adjudicative Officer positions at the Hearing
level to oversee prehearing development, meet claimants, narrow
issues for appeal, and recommend decisions on the record. The
Plan calls for substantial modification, if not elimination, of the
fourth level of agency review, the Appeals Council.
The Plan also proposes several substantive modifications in disa-
bility methodology, 10 9 which the advocacy community approaches
cautiously, concerned that changes may eliminate many currently-
eligible persons from the SSI program. The following sections fo-
104. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,887-940 (1994).
105. The original Reengineering Proposal suggested that the accommodations that
employers might make in accordance with the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA") should be considered, both in determining whether impairments were disa-
bling, and in considering whether jobs exist in the national economy that could be
performed by disabled claimants. These references to ADA were omitted from the
revised Reengineering Plan, in the face of uniform and articulate opposition to shift-
ing the burden of complying with ADA, a civil rights law, to disability claimants, the
persons ADA was intended to protect. See, e.g., Testimony of Prof. Matthew DUller,
Fordham University School of Law, before the House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on Social Security at 43 (Apr. 14, 1995); Testimony of Martha E. Ford, id. at 48.
106. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PUB.
No. 01-006, DISABILITY PROCESS REDESIGN: NEXT STEPS IN IMPLEMENTATION
(1994).
107. Id at 1.
108. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,905-15 (1994) (describing basic components of proposal).
109. See infra discussion at part III.F.
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cus on these aspects of the agency's Reengineering and Implemen-
tation Plans.
A. Initial Claims for Disability Benefits
It is extraordinarily difficult under the current process for claim-
ants to understand what information is needed to prove disabil-
ity.110 When applying for benefits, claimants are faced with a vast
array of forms. They may come to the benefits office without all
the facts they will be asked to provide."' Few of us could accu-
rately produce the requisite information on the spot, yet the data
provided at the initial application is the basis for the agency's evi-
dentiary development of the claim, and completeness is therefore
crucial. In addition, claimants are asked, to describe their disability.
Because they may be unaware of aspects of their medical history,
or may be in denial or perhaps ashamed, claimants may not reveal
such disabilities as mental illness or substance addiction. 1 2 Fur-
ther, claimants are rarely provided with a clear framework to un-
derstand how the information requested by the agency drives the
determination process.
When their claims are denied, claimants have a hard time ac-
cepting the decision because they do not feel they have been heard.
Under the current process, they are unlikely to meet the decision-
maker face-to-face, either to tell their story or to be told why they
are being denied benefits. It is common for Social Security to deny
a claim simply because hospitals or doctors have not responded to
the agency's request for medical records in a timely manner, result-
ing in the absence of evidence on which to award benefits. As the
agency explains, "[o]ften claimants do not understand how the de-
cision was made and, therefore, believe that it was reached arbi-
trarily,"" 3 rather than on the basis of lack of evidence. This
necessary evidence may have been obtainable through the claim-
ants' own efforts if the agency had encouraged a more active role
110. The agency is a harsh self-critic of its "complex, confusing process," a "'one
size fits all' approach to the intake and processing of claims." 59 Fed. Reg. 47,904
(1994).
111. The application forms ask, for example, for name and address and dates of
treatment for each medical provider, names and dosages of medications, job titles and
employers' addresses for the last fifteen years, as well as detailed financial informa-
tion. Claimants need to show a birth certificate, original social security card, rent re-
ceipt and original statement of any public benefits they are receiving.
112. Some SSA local offices do not provide a private space for taking disability
claims. Applicants whose responses can be overheard by others may be unwilling to
discuss their situation fully.
113. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,904 (1994).
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for them. Claimants who do not believe that they have been
treated fairly are likely to appeal, regardless of the merit of their
claim.
The Reengineering Plan addresses these problems in several
ways, from providing new informational packets (in English and
other languages) both for claimants114 and for the doctors and hos-
pitals1 5 to whom SSA looks for evidence, to creating face-to-face
decision-making at the initial determination. 116 No claimant would
be denied benefits without first receiving a notice stating exactly
what evidence the agency has in the record, and offering the claim-
ant the opportunity to submit additional evidence and to have a
personal interview."17
To accomplish the above changes, the original Reengineering
Proposal would create a new position, titled Disability Claims
Manager, as a claimant's single point of contact for processing both
the medical and nonmedical aspects of the initial claim." 8 The
Claims Manager would meet with the claimant and would use a
"simplified decision methodology" and "one set of standards for
decision-making" in an automated claim processing system to store
information, develop evidence and communicate with medical con-
sultants and others." 9 The Claims Manager proposal is a dramatic
shift from the current claims examiner process, where those who
114. Id. at 47,907. The goal is to target likely beneficiaries through community out-
reach and known sources of referrals, such as doctors and third-party organizations
that assist disabled persons, and explain the medical and nonmedical requirements, as
well as the decision-making process. SSA will also put the information on line for
electronic retrieval and filing. SSA will replace the multiple-form application with a
"starter application" for the claimant to complete (filing this would protect the claim-
ant's filing date) and a medical information form designed for the claimant's treating
source(s) to complete. Every claimant will have an intake interview in person or by
video-conferencing (within three to fourteen days according to SSA predictions). Id.
115. Id. at 47,915-16 (describing development of standardized request forms to re-
place wholesale procurement of actual medical records, with compensation to health
care providers for time spent preparing forms).
116. Id. at 47,908-10.
117. Id. at 47,910. The Reengineering Plan would allow video conference or tele-
phone interviews as well. Current regulations permit a face-to-face predetermination
interview as demonstration projects. 20 C.F.R. § 404.906 (1994).
118. 59 Fed. Reg. 18,212, 218 (1994). The Disability Claim Manager position is de-
scribed in the September Plan as a goal to be achieved in the longer term as SSA puts
in place tools, technological support and staff training. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,908-09 (1994).
119. 59 Fed. Reg. 18,218-19 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 47,908-09 (1994). The original
proposal sidestepped the question of paramount interest to current employees: what
will happen to our jobs? The qualifications for a Claims Manager, and the role of
local field office staff and state Disability Determination Service staff when such a
position is created, were not stated in the proposal. It is, therefore, perhaps unsur-
prising that Commissioner Chater has put the single claims manager concept on hold.
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decide medical eligibility never meet the claimant and where sev-
eral people at the local office handle different pieces of the claim
before shipping the file to an entirely different location (the state
Disability Determination Service) for decision on medical
eligibility. 12 0
The revised Reengineering Plan, however, took a step back, say-
ing that in the near term, SSA "will seek ways of working in teams"
to improve service at the application decision-making level. 121 The
"team" concept rather than a single claims manager was forcefully
advocated by the National Council of Disability Determination Di-
rectors ("NCDDD").122 NCDDD argued that creating a single
claims manager position would have negative labor relations impli-
cations, would hold potential for employee fraud and could not be
achieved for many years because the concept is dependent on com-
plex training and computer technology. 123 The NCDDD proposal
preserves but modifies the Reengineering Plan's face-to-face fea-
ture. The claimant's first contact would be, as it is now, a Claims
Representative who would complete the non-disability portion of
the application before introducing the claimant to a Disability Ex-
aminer, who would then be responsible "for taking the disability
portion of the claim, case development, adjudication, and generally
'managing' the claim.' 24 The SSA task team charged with devel-
oping team approaches for processing claims recommended this
scenario. 125
Another significant and responsive reform proposed by the
Reengineering Plan is providing claimants with an opportunity to
120. As noted in part II, supra note 60, currently, up to twenty-six employees have
handled an initial claim by the time it is decided. SSA has been testing five models of
face-to-face interviewing. See Milton M. Carrow, A Tortuous Road to Bureaucratic
Fairness: Righting the Social Security Disability Claims Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
297, 298-99 (1994).
121. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,889 (1994).
122. See Letter from Lloyd Moses, President, NCDDD, to Commissioner Shirley
Sears Chater, Social Security Administration 2-4 (July 25, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Moses Letter]. In part, Commissioner Chater is responding to union con-
cerns about the effect of the Claims Manager proposal on staff at the state Disability
Determination offices.
123. Id at 2-3.
124. Id. at 3. This proposal seems to contemplate locating Disability Determination
staff in local SSA field offices. Currently, the DDS and SSA operate at different
locations.
125. DCM Team Scenarios: Report from the EA/DCM Task Team 1-2, Tab A (Feb.
16, 1995) (on file with author). The report outlined other approaches, including team-
ing with third-party providers, Reconsideration interviews at DDS, "outstationing" of
DDS disability examiners in SSA field offices, and making direct referrals to DDS.
Id. at Tabs C-E, G.
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supplement the record and meet the decision-maker face-to-face
prior to an initial denial.1 2 6 As noted in the preceding discussion of
the need for change in the disability determination process, claims
often are denied simply for lack of evidence. A doctor or hospital
may not have responded to SSA's request for records, or the claim-
ant may not have listed some care providers or divulged sensitive
information. The proposed predecision interchange between
claimants and SSA should be helpful in remedying this.
A final reform at the initial claim level is a "Statement of the
Claim" approach to decisions. SSA describes this approach as one
that would give claimants more information on the issues, relevant
facts, evidence and rationale behind the decision. 127 SSA reasons
that if it provides fuller information to claimants, they can make
more informed decisions whether or not to appeal. 2 8 Reengineer-
ing will be successful only if the new procedures ensure more cor-
rect decisions at an earlier stage and reduce the number of cases
appealed to ALJs.
Taken together, these changes should increase the number of
correct initial decisions, as well as satisfy claimants' concerns about
receiving fair consideration. The changes are consistent with rec-
ommendations made by others who have proposed reform of the
disability determination process, including the American Bar Asso-
ciation.' 2 9 Advocates should be vigilant, however, as the qualifica-
tions and training for frontline personnel take shape. Whether the
Disability Claims Managers are single persons or a team, it will be
crucial that they see their job as developing the claim. To do this
successfully will require a comprehensive understanding of the
legal and medical standards for disability so that claims managers
ask the right questions. Claim managers also will need skills in lis-
tening and creating empathetic relationships with claimants.
126. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,910 (1994).
127. Id. at 47,910. The American Bar Association has urged this reform of the
application process since 1986, and reiterated it in comments on the Redesign Propo-
sal. See Letter of Robert D. Evans, ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to Rhoda
M.G. Davis, Director, SSA Disability Reengineering Project (May 19, 1994) (attach-
ing 1986 and 1991 Resolutions adopted by the ABA House of Delegates) (on fie with
author).
128. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,910 (1994).
129. See Report accompanying ABA Resolution 109A, supra note 22, at 7-10; see
also Moore, supra note 40, at 42 (emphasizing importance of visual picture of claim-
ant and providing opportunity to present favorable evidence).
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B. A Single Rule Book Throughout the Disability
Determination Process
The Plan announces that SSA will develop "a single presentation
of all substantive policies used in the determination of eligibility
for benefits. All decision-makers will be bound by these same poli-
cies, which will be published in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act."' 30 This proposal is on a fast track. 131 The "Pro-
cess Unification Disability Process Redesign Team" addressing this
aspect of the Reengineering Proposal states that by the end of fis-
cal year 1996, it will:
create a plan to ensure that all adjudicative policy guidelines ad-
equately reflect the requirements of the Act and regulations;
create a plan to meld existing adjudicative policy documents
into a unified vehicle, addressing the level at which this would
be promulgated (regulation, ruling, sub-instruction), procedures
for compiling and updating, an expedited clearance mechanism,
and a mechanism to ensure timeliness and flexibility in respond-
ing to immediate needs such as legislative changes and litigation;
and decide how procedures contained in existing policy docu-
ments (including the Disability Determination Services and the
Office of Hearings and Appeals manuals) will be handled or
eliminated and how nonadjudicative policy will be separated
from adjudicative.' 32
Every commentator on disability determination reform who ad-
dresses the issue agrees on the need for a uniform decision-making
standard, but not as to what that standard should be. The adminis-
trative law judges and advocates: agree that the DDS should con-
form to the legal standards set forth in the statute, regulations and
130. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,910 (1994). To the lawyer, this statement is odd: of course one
set of standards should be used throughout the process, and of course these standards
should be promulgated through notice-and-comment rule-making. As noted, supra
part II, one of the Alice in Wonderland aspects of social security practice, however, is
the use of disparate standards by the Disability Determination Services (which decide
claims at the application and reconsideration stages) and the Office of Hearings and
Appeals. Administrative Law Judges in the OHA consider themselves bound by both
case law and by APA-enacted regulations published in- the Code of Federal Regula-
tions ("CFR"). SSA publishes Social Security Rulings, which are precedential court
decisions and policy statements or interpretations that SSA has adopted as binding
policy. Disability determination staff at the various state agencies, however, do not
consider themselves bound by regulations published in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, by legal precedent or by the Social Security Rulings. Rather, they decide claims
through the application of SSA's internally-published POMS.
131. See IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at, 13 (fiscal years 1995-1996).
132. Quoted in NOSSCR, Re-Engineering Update, 16 Soc. SECURITY FORUM 3
(1994).
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case law.'33 The disability examiners, on the other hand, speaking
through their national association, think that radical changes have
to be made at the Office of Hearings and Appeals level.13 4 SSA
takes the middle ground. SSA recently concluded that: decision-
makers at both levels sometimes use inappropriate review
criteria. 135
SSA projects that it can create a single policy compilation within
six to twelve months.'36 The challenge of creating a unified set of
APA-enacted policies is daunting. Not only must SSA find some
way to merge a full volume of the Code of Federal Regulations,
legal precedent and a vast compendium of interpretations, but it
must also find a way to present this material in a form that can be
used by its frontline staff137 and claimants.138
A single source of decision-making rules, adopted with the pro-
cedural safeguards of notice-and-comment rulemaking, is a posi-
tive goal. Advocates for claimants should take a proactive
position. The new rules, it seems clear, will not be purely proce-
dural since the Reengineering Plan also proposes substantial
changes in the decisional methodology. 139 Advocates should cer-
tainly be alert to changes 'in standards that are inconsistent with the
statute and to favorable court decisions achieved through hard-
fought litigation. Such' precedent is the currency of advocacy, the
fruits of cumulative lawsuits to enforce Congress's intent to assist
disabled people. "Starting over" to accumulate construals of new
133. E.g., Nat'l Conf. of Administrative Law Judges SSA Disability Resolution #12
(Feb. 1994), reprinted in Moore, supra note 40, at 47.
134. Moses Letter, supra note 122, at 7.
135. See NOSCCR, Different Conclusions, supra note 87-90 and accompanying text.
(reporting on Office of Program Integrity and Review study indicating that judges and
medical consultants/disability examiners disagree whether each others' decisions are
supported by substantial evidence).
136. See IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at 14.
137. Although SSA has deferred the decision to create a single person as a point of
contact who will both originate and adjudicate a claim, ultimately the Plan contem-
plates a single disability claim manager who will be expected to understand all the
aspects of the rules governing both non-medical and medical criteria for eligibility. 59
Fed. Reg. 47,908 (1994). The Plan-does not suggest that the Disability Claim manager
will be a person with either legal or medical training.
138. A stated goal of new rules is ease of understanding. For example, although
Commissioner Chater states that SSA is deferring decision whether to replace the
current "Listings" of impairments with a new Index of Disabling Impairments, the
September Plan states that there will be such an Index in time, and that it "will be as
nontechnical as possible'.. . and simple enough so that laypersons will be able to
understand what is required to demonstrate a disabling impairment in the index." Id.
at 47,912.
139. See infra discussion at part III.F.
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rules can drain the energies of the advocacy community and the
agency. On the other hand, advocates should be open to modifying
rules that now delay determinations for their clients. Alternative
decision-making systems may work better. 140
Because the majority of claimants are unrepresented, the rules
of decision must be accessible to all, not just the highly trained.
Therefore, advocates have an obligation to be actively involved in
the course of creating a unified decision-making process, and to
ensure that simplification does not mask destructive substantive
changes in standards.
C. Elimination of Reconsideration Level of Review
As discussed above, delay is a primary issue for disability claim-
ants. SSA's computer-generated test model projects that imple-
mentation of the Plan-a six-year process-will enable it to
shorten the time from application to initial decision from 155 to
less than forty days 4 ' and the time from appeal to a hearing deci-
sion from eighteen to five months.142 A key factor in reducing the
delay is the elimination of the Reconsideration level of appeal
which is planned for fiscal years 1997-98, after publication of im-
plementing regulations.'43 The agency reasons that the need for
intermediate appeal will not be necessary once the planned re-
forms are in place for initial determinations. There will be a fully
developed evidentiary record, the claimant will have been given a
chance to submit additional evidence prior to an adverse ruling,
and the agency will issue a "statement of the claim" decision that
will state the basis and rationale for its decision.'" Further, as dis-
cussed below, the adjudicator for the initial determination will
have used the same standards that will apply if the decision is ap-
pealed. 45 Additionally, SSA will have standardized how it puts
together files (and eventually make this process entirely electronic)
140. An example of this kind of open-minded examination is Walter Gelihorn's
comparative study of the United States' litigation model medical malpractice system
and New Zealand's statutory no-fault social insurance system, which compensates all
injured persons. Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical
Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REv. 170, 188-202 (1988).
141. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,929, app. II: Model Results (1994).
142. Id at 47,916. SSA projects that elimination of Reconsideration will shorten
decision time from application to issuance of a decision by an Administrative Law
Judge from the present average of one and a half years to five months. Id. at 47,929.
143. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at 10.
144. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,916 (1994).
145. Id.
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so that a case can move easily from the initial determination to the
Office of Hearings and Appeals. 46
Because so few claimants succeed at Reconsideration-only
14%1 47 r-the elimination of this step in the process will not be
mourned by many. Various groups and scholars have urged this
reform. 148 Although one might expect Administrative Law Judges,
who are currently facing a backlog of over half a million cases, to,
be nervous about the removal of a buffer between them and disap-
pointed claimants, 149 in fact the National Conference of Adminis-
trative Law Judges favors abolition of Reconsideration. 5 °
D. Adjudication Officers
The Reengineering Plan proposes a new position at the local Of-
fices of Hearings and Appeals, an Adjudication Officer, who may
serve some of the same screening functions as the Disability Deter-
mination Services. SSA has stepped up implementation of Adjudi-
cation Officer positions, originally scheduled for 1997-98.11 By
summer of 1995, Adjudication Officers ("AOs") should be in place
at nine to twelve test sites, with nationwide implementation possi-
146. Id. SSA began implementing a "standardized folder" in April-May 1995. See
supra discussion at note 69. Eventually, disability files will be entirely electronic.
147. 59 Fed. Reg. at 47,902 (1994).
148. See, e.g., American Bar Association Resolution 109A, supra note 22, at Point 6
(eliminate reconsideration; appeal directly from initial denial to ALJ); Carrow, supra
note 120, at 302-03 (citing other studies making this recommendation); FRANK S.
BLOCH, DISABILITY DETERMINATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE
ROLE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL 192 (1992) (noting that reconsideration is unneces-
sary if other recommendations, including fully-developed medical records, face-to-
face interview and opportunity to supplement record, are provided).
149. Social Security acknowledges that the present drawn-out appeal process dis-
courages some claimants from pursuing their appeal rights. They simply drop out. 59
Fed. Reg. 47,916 (1994). Over half of those initially denied benefits do not appeal.
Id. at 47,902 (52%).
150. See SSA Disability Resolution Adopted by the National Conference of Ad-
ministrative Law Judges, Point 3 (Feb. 1994), appended to Moore, supra note 40, at
46. Moore opines that "under the current system, DDS is simply doing half the job,
but doing it twice." Id. at 43. This Resolution came to the ABA House of Delegates
in Jan. 1995, but was withdrawn, largely because of the concerns expressed by the
ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, which thought many of its rec-
ommendations duplicated existing ABA policy, and that others were ill-advised. Let-
ter of John H. Pickering, Special Advisor to the Comm'n (Dec. 22, 1994) (on file with
author). Pickering's group, however, fully supports elimination of Reconsideration,
id. at 2, as has the ABA since August 1991. See Report accompanying Resolution
109A of the American Bar Ass'n, adopted by the House of Delegates, Feb. 1994, at 3-
4 (reiterating position).
151. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at 10.
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bly occurring as early as December 1995.152 AOs will meet with
claimants and/or their representatives to explain the hearing pro-
cess, obtain new evidence and attempt to narrow the issues being
appealed.1 53 A~s can issue fully favorable decisions, if supported
by the evidence, and can approve the representative's fee, thus
shortening the time that claimants spend waiting for a hearing and
the time that representatives spend waiting for payment. 54
Procedural reform at the hearing level is critical. The backlog of
cases has passed half a million. Advocates should be attentive to
the development of this reform. One concern is job qualifications.
Apparently, SSA has decided that AOs will not be required to
have law degrees or legal training, but must have "a college degree
or equivalent qualifying experience."' 55 If AOs are not trained in
the law, they may perpetuate some of the defects in the DDS deci-
sion-making. Another concern is claimants' due process rights. If
unrepresented claimants agree to narrow the issues at a hearing, or
to take on the agency's responsibility to develop the evidentiary
record, they may be seriously prejudiced. On the other hand, SSA
is already experimenting with methods to identify cases that are
likely to be reversed on appeal, and to expedite them.' 56 Because
AOs will be able to issue only fully favorable decisions, some
claimants will benefit from this reform because their cases will be
decided with less delay. Other claimants should not be harmed;
they should proceed to a hearing.
152. Pre-implementation Testing Plan in ADJUDICATION OFFICER PROCEDURES
HANDBOOK (n.d.) (copy provided author Mar. 17, 1995) (on file with author) [herein-
after AO HANDBOOK]. SSA will test the AOs in at least nine sites, located equally in
local field offices, DDS offices and OHA offices. Id. at 10.
153. AO HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 1. The AO Handbook allows AOs to issue
fully favorable decisions without meeting with the claimant. Id. at 2.
154. Id.at 1, 7.
155. Id. at Testing Plan p. 9. SSA emphasizes competencies in analysis, writing,
negotiation, oral communication, practice management and substantive knowledge of
the relevant law and the disability programs.
156. SSA has compiled profiles for screening cases appealed to an AUA, using a
score according to a set of case characteristics associated with higher than normal
incidence of decisional error, and is implementing a prehearing conference initiative
using senior attorneys. See NOSSCR, SSA Profile Screening Project, 17 Soc. SECUR-
mry FORUM 11-13 (1995). NOSSCR criticizes applying the screening only to appealed
cases, rather than to all reconsideration denials, since many claimants do not request a
hearing because they are confused or discouraged. Id. at 12.
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E. A Modified Role for the Appeals Council
The Reengineering Plan proposed eliminating the Appeals
Council as a prerequisite to appealing to federal court.157 The
Council would evaluate all claims filed, however, and seek volun-
tary remand from the court for the purpose of affirming, reversing
or remanding-a power it now has under existing law.158
Advocates have mixed views about this proposal. On the one
hand, the Appeals Council stage accounts for additional delay, and
only a small percentage of cases are successful. 159 On the other
hand, appealing to federal court is costly for claimants, who must
obtain a lawyer, pay filing fees, and the like. Additionally, in terms
of sheer numbers, more claimants prevail at the Appeals Council
than in court. On balance, the better position is to retain the
Council, but to impose a time limit on its review, after which claim-
ants can choose to proceed to federal court without further delay.
In any event, influential voices, such as the Department of Justice,
oppose elimination of the Appeals Council until SSA can demon-
strate that its procedural reforms will reduce, rather then increase,
the number of cases appealed to federal court.160
F. Decisional Methodology
The Plan describes a simplified, four-step disability decision
methodology for both adults and children, relying on a new Index
of Disabling Impairments, "standardized" functional assessments,
and a concept of "baseline of occupational demands." Advocates
felt blind-sided when the reengineering team proposed changes in
decisional methodology, exceeding its stated mandate of examining
disability procedures.161 The definition of disability had been ex-
pressly declared to be off limits. 62 Several such advocates have
157. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,917 (1994).
158. Id. See Social Security Act, § 205(g) (permitting voluntary remand prior to
SSA's filing an answer). The Judicial Conference of the United States believes this
power raises serious jurisdictional issues. Gerry Letter, supra note 77, at 1-2.
159. See supra discussion at part II.A.5.
160. NOSSCR, 16 Soc. SECURITY FORUM 3 (Dec. 1994) (Dept. of Justice opposi-
tion to eliminating Appeals Council as mandatory step of review causing slow down
of this aspect of Reengineering until SSA can substantiate its projections that federal
court appeals will decrease, not increase, under the Plan). The Judicial Conference of
the U.S. Courts opposes the elimination of the Appeals Council for the same reason.
See Gerry Letter, supra note 77, at 2-3.
161. E.g., Letter from 'Ethel Zelenske & Kim Savage, Staff Attorneys, Nat'l Sr.
Citizens L. Center, to SSA Disability Reengineering Project, at 8 (May 26, 1994) (on
file with author); Diller testimony, supra note 105, at 43.
162. 59 Fed. Reg. 18,188 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 47,888 (1994).
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criticized SSA for proposing changes in the standards for disability
in the guise of administrative reform.'63 The Commissioner has
mollified critics by stating that this aspect of the Reengineering
Plan will not be "fully developed, tested, and implemented nation-
ally" within the six-year project period. 16
The current process of determining disability involves five se-
quential steps.165 First, the claimant must not be "engaged in sub-
stantial gainful activity." Second, the impairment or combination
of impairments must be severe. Third, SSA, through the DDS,
evaluates whether the medical records establish that the claimant's
physical and/or mental disability or combination of disabilities
"meet or equal" an impairment in the "Listing of Impairments." If
the impairments are severe but do not meet or equal a listing, SSA
evaluates whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity
to return to past relevant work. If the claimant cannot, then SSA
evaluates whether, considering the claimant's age, education, work
experience and residual functional capacity, there is any work in
the national economy that the claimant can perform. A finding of
disability can be made at Steps 3,,4 or 5. The claimant has the
burden of proof for the first four steps; the burden shifts to the
agency at Step 5.
The Reengineering Plan proposes changing this structure. First,
the Plan eliminates the second step (severe impairment) for adults.
Second, the current "Listings" would be replaced with an "Index"
of impairments to apply at Step 3. The Index would be "nontechni-
cal" and easy for laypersons to understand.166 Third, the Plan elim-
inates "medical equivalence.' 1 67 Fourth, SSA would employ a new
standardized measure of functional assessment. Rather than the
163. See, e.g., Diller testimony, supra note 105; Zelenske & Savage, supra note 161,
at 8-17.
164. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at 2. When the SSA released the re-
vised "Disability Reengineering Project Plan" in September, the advocacy community
was relieved that the Commissioner stated that the agency was deferring its conclu-
sions about the "ultimate place in the disability process" of proposals to change the
"decisional methodology that deal with functional assessment, baseline of work, and
the evaluation of age," pending "study and deliberation with experts and consumers."
59 Fed. Reg. 47,889 (1994) (message from Commissioner Shirley S. Chater). How-
ever, the Implementation Plan uses less definite language, implying that the question
is not whether to develop, test, and implement the proposed simplified methodology,
but rather how long that process would take. This ambiguity makes it especially im-
portant that claimants' advocates track the development of the "simplified decisional
methodology."
165. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1994).
166. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,911-12 (1994).
167. Id.
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current, individualized assessment, which compares claimants'
functional capacity and the existence of jobs they can actually per-
form in light of their age, education and work experience, 168 the
Plan suggests adoption of a single "baseline of occupational de-
mands" against which all (except those nearing full retirement age)
would be measured. 169 If this proposal were adopted and applied,
advocates conclude that thousands of current recipients of SSI
would be found "not disabled."
Similarly, in determining children's disability, the Plan proposes
substantive changes, although it accepts as given both the current
statutory definition of disability (a child is disabled "if he suffers
from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of
comparable severity [to an adult]") 170 and the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the relevant statutory language in Sullivan v. Zeb-
ley. 17 1 The Plan proposes, however, both to use an Index of
Disabling Impairments to determine medical eligibility, and to cre-
ate a standardized instrument to measure a child's functional abil-
ity as objectively as possible. 72 These changes would be put off
until the use of such instruments had been tested for adults.173
There are several reasons not to disturb the present children's
disability methodology as part of the Reengineering Plan. A panel
appointed by Congress is currently preparing a report on children's
disability.174 Any change in the process should at least await this
report expected to be issued in November 1995. Further, a panel
of experts overhauled the children's disability process in the wake
168. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2 (1994) (the "Grids").
169. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,911-14 (1994).
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). If enacted into law, the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act, H.R. 4, would modify this definition. See infra discussion at
part IV.
171. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). As noted infra note 197, the Personal Responsibility Act
proposes to overturn the Zebley decision by eliminating the requirement that SSA
consider the effects of children's impairments on their functional ability. Under the
proposed legislation, children will be found disabled only if their condition is de-
scribed in the Index of Disabling Impairments.
172. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,915 (1994).
173. Id.
174. In 1994, Congress directed the Secretary to appoint a 9-15 member commis-
sion to study the effect of the current definition of disability for children under 18,
federal health care, vouchers, rehabilitation, trusts, and the effects of the current pro-
gram on families. Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 202 (1994). The National Comm'n on Child-
hood Disability, 801 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 625, Washington, DC, phone: (202)
272-2228, is holding hearings throughout the United States from March through June
1995 in preparation for its report, due in November 1995.
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of Sullivan v. Zebley175 four years ago. The Plan does not explain
why SSA should rethink this process so soon. 1 76 Although the me-
dia has carried stories critical of SSA for awarding benefits to
growing numbers of "undeserving" children, 77 some advocates
maintain that the growth of beneficiaries in this category since 1990
largely reflects the agency's improper denial of benefits until the
Supreme Court mandated compliance with the Social Security Act.
SSA's own empirical studies demonstrate the gap between reality
and anecdote. For example, the perception that large numbers of
children are coached by adults to present fraudulent information
about their functioning was not supported by data in an SSA
study.178 The Government Accounting Office recently acknowl-
edged that there is "limited empirical data" but "widespread media
reports [that] have weakened the public confidence in the int.egrity
of the SSI program. ''1 79
Although advocates should be watchful as SSA considers
changes in methodology, they should not be inflexible about
change if they are to help solve their clients' most pressing con-
cern-delay in decision-making. Advocates must be willing to dis-
cuss changes in the procedure and substance of the methodology
that will enable fewer SSA staff to reach correct decisions more
quickly than SSA can today. The reengineering process offers ad-
vocates an opportunity to suggest systems that better effectuate
Congress's intent to.assess a claimant's functional capacity in light
of the factors of age, work experience, education and limitations
resulting from their disabilities.
175. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). See generally Julie A. Clark, Determining Disability for
Children: Implementation of Sullivan v. Zebley, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 246 (1991);
THE ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO SSI FOR CHILDREN (1992 & 1994 Supp.), published by
Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 1101 15th St. NW, Suite 1212,
Washington, D.C. 20005.
176. SSA reassessed the factual validity of the Grids in 1992 and concluded that
they remain valid. 57 Fed. Reg. 43,005; see also Diller testimony, supra note 105, at
42.
177. See, e.g., John B. O'Donnell & Jim Haner, America's most wanted welfare plan
[sic], BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 22, 1995, at 1A.
178. A case-by-case review by SSA of 617 childrens' cases with diagnoses that are
suspected to be "faked" most often found only thirteen instances of possible coaching
or malingering. SSA, FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY OF TITLE XVI CHILDHOOD DISA-
BILITY CLAIMS ii (1994). SSA had granted benefits in only three of the thirteen cases.
Id.
179. GAO, FEDERAL DISABILITY PROGRAMS FACE MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 26,
at 10-11. Perceptions based on anecdotal evidence are influencing the Republican
House of Representatives, as recent legislation attests. See infra discussion at part
IV.D.
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G. Ethics Rules
The Reengineering Plan proposes to create a code of profes-
sional conduct, providing for sanctions against representatives, 80
including suspension and disqualification.' 8' It would be more ac-
curate to say "revise a code" because current regulations provide
some guidance in these areas. 1 SSA predicts that such standards
will be implemented in the very near term.183 The Task Team cir-
culated a first draft for comments in February 1995 and plans to
circulate revised drafts before SSA issues a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in June 1995.184 The first draft was flawed by lack of
clarity as to its purpose, and by overbroad language. For example,
it proposed incorporating the attorney's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct by reference, but then imposed responsibilities,
such as supplying evidence adverse to one's client, that are in direct
conflict with the Rules.
The ethics questions raised by social security representation are
complex and inadequately explored. 185 Advocates should pay at-
tention to the development of these rules. While the goal of
promulgating rules that ensure that representatives are qualified,
adequately represent their clients and are accountable for miscon-
duct 186 are worthy, other goals, such as a duty to develop the rec-
ord fully, are questionable. 187 In any case, the language of the rules
deserves close review.
180. See Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 206 (1994) (civil money penalties for knowingly
making or omitting any material fact in disability determinations). See Robert E.
Rains, The Advocate's Conflicting Obligations Vis-a-Vis Adverse Medical Evidence in
Social Security Proceedings, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 99 (discussing this provision in con-
text of attorney's ethical dilemma caused by knowledge or possession of adverse
evidence).
181. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,921 (1994). SSA hopes its "user-friendly new process" will
make it more realistic for claimants to proceed without representation, since many
resent having to pay up to 25% (a maximum of $4000) of retroactive benefits they
may be awarded to their representatives as the Social Security Act now permits.
182. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1720, 45; 416.1540, 45.
183. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 36, at 13 (fiscal years 1995-96).
184. NOSSCR, 16 Soc. SECURrrY FORUM 1 (Dec. 1994). The letter of agreement
between the reengineering office and the Office of Hearings and Appeals states three
objectives for the rules: assuring qualified representatives for all claimants; defining
SSA's expectations and responsibility to work with claimants to develop the record;
and establishing a code of professional conduct with sanctions. Id
185. For analysis of sources of attorneys' conflicting ethical obligations, see Rains,
supra note 180, at 105-29.
186. Id.
187. Advocates should be attentive to the ramifications of a statement that it is a
claimant's representative's duty to develop the record fully. This has always been the
responsibility of the agency-and is of considerable importance in the case of unrep-
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In sum, the Reengineering Plan contains many suggestions that
are responsive to the identified need for procedural reform. Many
of the proposals, such as improvements in the initial application
stage and elimination of the Reconsideration stage in the appeal
process, have been recommended by scholars and practitioners for
years. Other ideas have less of a pedigree, but are worthy of seri-
ous consideration by concerned advocates. The Social Security
Administration, with the active participation of claimants' advo-
cates, should be encouraged to "reengineer" the disability determi-
nation process so that it costs less, works more quickly, and reaches
correct decisions the first time. Advocates should contact SSA to
insist that it act on its commitment to open communication about
its process. 188 Advocates should ask to meet with a "task team"
assigned to develop further planning in the various substantive and
procedural aspects of the proposed reengineered disability deter-
mination process, or ask for regular meetings in the various SSA
regions. 189
IV. The 104th Congress and the Supplemental Security
Income Program
The Republican-controlled House of Representatives opened
the 104th Congress with a focus on reducing welfare spending. As
introduced in the House of Representatives, the Personal Respon-
sibility Act' 90 would have ended SSI as an entitlement program,' 9'
resented claimants. The Plan also proposes that claimants take an active role in ob-
taining record evidence but states that SSA will retain ultimate responsibility for
development of claims for unrepresented claimants. 59 Fed. Reg. 47,909-10 (1994).
In particular, the Plan shifts to the representative, or claimant when able to do so,
"the primary burden of compiling an evidentiary record" at the hearing level. Id. at
47,917.
188. Id. at 47,920.
189. The Director of the Disability Process Redesign Team is Chuck A. Jones, for-
merly Director of the Michigan Disability Determination Service. His address is SSA,
929 Altmeyer Bldg., 6401 Security Blvd., Baltimore, MD 21235, phone: (410) 966-
8255, FAX: (410) 966-9884. Ethel Zelenske, Staff Attorney at the National Senior
Citizens Law Center, has urged Mr. Jones to put such processes in place so that advo-
cates can keep their constituencies informed, as well as share their "wealth of substan-
tive and practical knowledge about the disability process" with the redesign task
teams. Letter from Ethel Zelenske, Staff Attorney, Nat'l Sr. Citizens L. Center, to
Chuck A. Jones (Oct. 28, 1994) (on file with author).
190. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), is the Republican welfare reform bill
promised in the Contract With America, supra note 27.
191. H.R. 4 § 302(2) (terminating the SSI as an entitlement program effective Octo-
ber 1, 1995); §§ 301 (a)(1), (2)(B), (b)(2) (capping federal expenditures for the pro-
gram at fiscal year 1995 levels with limited adjustments for inflation and the change in
the poverty population). The inflator "shall be the percentage change in the Implicit
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a possibility that had not been mentioned in the Contract With
America. The bill reported out of the House Ways and Means
Committee"9z and the final version of H.R. 4 enacted by the House
of Representatives on March 24, 1995, did not terminate SSI, but
did cap benefits for children and also restricted the SSI eligibility of
three groups: legal aliens, drug and alcohol-disabled persons, and
disabled children.
Whether the Senate will concur in these major substantive
changes in the SSI disability program is unclear as this, Article goes
to press. Among all legal aliens, only new refugees, very elderly
legal residents, and those who serve in the armed forces would re-
main eligible for SSI if H.R. 4 is enacted. 193 Among all who are
disabled because of drug addiction or alcoholism, only those for
whom drug addiction or alcoholism is not "a contributing factor
Gross Domestic Product deflator published by the Department of Commerce for the
most recently available fiscal year over the preceding fiscal year." Id. at
§ 301(a)(2)(A). The change in poverty population was defined as "the percentage by
which the number of poor people in the United States in the most recent fiscal year
for which data are available from the annual report on poverty published by the Bu-
reau of the Census differs from the number of poor people in the preceding fiscal
year, as computed by the Congressional Budget Office during January of the calendar
year in which the fiscal year subject to the restriction begins." Id. at § 301(a)(2)(B).
Putting aside the drafting deficiencies of this definition, the fact is that there is no
necessary correlation between the number of poor people in the United States and
the number of disabled poor people. Furthermore, many eligible persons are not re-
ceiving SSI. The Social Security Administration has encouraged numerous outreach
projects in recent years because there are so many eligible persons-from low birth
weight babies to the elderly-who have not applied for the program because of vari-
ous barriers.
192. On March 7, 1995, the House Committee on Ways and Means reported out
H.R. 1157, the "Welfare Transformation Act of 1995," a variant of the Personal Re-
sponsibility Act. Title IV addressed SSI; Title III restricted welfare for aliens. These
titles were incorporated in the final version of H.R. 4.
193. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (a)(1)-(5) (Mar. 24, 1995) (with exceptions,
legal aliens ineligible for SSI, Medicaid, food stamps, temporary assistance for needy
families and Title XX social services block grant programs). Excepted are refugees
for five years after arrival in the United States; lawful permanent residents over age
seventy-five who have been resident in the United States for at least five years; uni-
formed services members, honorably discharged veterans, and their spouses and de-
pendent children; and lawful permanent residents whose physical, developmental, or
mental impairment render them unable to comply with naturalization requirements.
Id. at §§ 403(b)(1)-(3), (6). Legal aliens on the date of enactment remain eligible for
the programs for one year. Id. at § 403(b)(5).
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material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is
disabled"' 94 would be eligible for SSI. 195
The House bill that was sent to the Senate in late March also
proposed transformative changes in the federal disability program
for poor children. 96 It would amend the 1972 definition of child-
hood disability in Title XVI (SSI) to eliminate the language the
Supreme Court has interpreted as requiring individualized func-
tional assessments for disabled children. 97 Children would be dis-
abled only if they meet the financial-eligibility requirements for
SSI and have a medically-determinable physical or mental impair-
ment or combination of impairments included in the Listings of
Impairments. 98 One estimate considered by the legislators is that
the House proposal would eliminate 224,000 of 890,000 children
from SSI soon after enactment. 199
The House bill also would eliminate cash benefits to disabled
children, except to those who currently receive them and to those
who are institutionalized or who require "personal assistance" to
remain at home.2 ° This would create the anomaly that among all
poor children, only the disabled poor child would be ineligible for
194. H.R. 4 § 601(a)(1). Under current regulations, drug addiction or alcoholism is
"material" when the individual would not be found disabled if drug or alcohol use
were to stop. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1), § 416.935(b)(1) (interim final rules enacted
Feb. 10, 1995, effective Mar. 1, 1995, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 103-296, supra note 32).
195. Public Law No. 103-296, enacted by the preceding Congress, limited disability
benefits based on drug addiction and alcoholism to thirty-six months in a lifetime,
required treatment and suspension of benefits for those who do not comply with
treatment and required representative payees rather than direct payment to the dis-
abled person. See generally Ethel Zelenske, The Social Security Reform Act of 1994,
28 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 897 (1994). The House bill sent to the Senate Mar. 29, 1995
would totally eliminate disability benefits to this subgroup. The bill, however, would
provide funding for public health treatment, medication development, and capacity
expansion through formula grants to states that apply. H.R. 4 § 601(d).
196. H.R. 4 § 602 ("Supplemental Security Income Benefits for Disabled
Children").
197. Section 602(a)(1)(D) of H.R. 4 would strike the following language: "(or, in
the case of an individual under the age of 18, if he suffers from any medically determi-
nable physical or mental impairment of comparable severity [to an adult])."
198. Id. at § 602(a)(1)(E). H.R. 4 requires the Commissioner to report to Congress
annually on necessary revisions to the Listings. Id. The Listings are discussed supra
at part III.
199. Spencer Rich, GOP Plan for Disabled Children Draws Fire, WASH. POST, Feb.
25, 1995, at A12 (citing House Ways & Means Comm. welfare aide). H.R. 4 would
require SSA to notify within a month of enactment all the children whose eligibility
for cash payments will terminate. H.R. 4 § 602(a)(1)(E)(iii)(2).
200. H.R. 4 § 602(a)(1)(E)(III)(aa)-(bb). "Personal assistance" means the child
needs hands-on or stand-by help for administering medical treatment or for eating,
toileting, dressing, bathing, and transferring. Id. at § (E)(iii).
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cash benefits.2"1 Instead of cash, beginning in fiscal year 1997, al-
most all disabled children would receive vouchers redeemable for
medical and nonmedical services "designed to meet (or assist in
meeting) the unique needs of qualifying children that arise from
physical or mental impairments. ' 20 2 States would not be able to
give cash to these disabled children even if they wished to do so.2 03
The money for services would come from a federal block grant
available to states that apply for funds. Under the grants, the
states would have discretion to decide which authorized services to
provide, who among qualifying children in the state will receive the
services, how many services to provide any child, and how long the
services should last.2°
These proposals raise several questions. Fundamentally, they
raise the question whether the government should provide subsis-
tence funds to totally disabled persons. If so, should SSI remain a
federal program and should it remain an entitlement program,
rather than a program in which the federal government provides
block grants to the states in a fixed amount, while or while out
regulating how that money is spent. Further, the proposals raise
the question whether limiting benefits available to certain sub-
groups-legal aliens, substance abusers, children-is good public
policy. Finally, in light of the foregoing discussion of the ways in
which the social security disability determination process needs to
be changed, the legislative proposals raise the question of respon-
siveness to these identified problems and need for procedural
reform.
A. Governments Should Provide Subsistence Benefits for the
Disabled
Saving money by eliminating subsistence benefits to the disabled
is unacceptable to voters, as evidenced by recent state initiatives in
welfare reform. In October 1991, the State of Michigan eliminated
its state program for General Public Assistance ("GPA"), which
paid cash benefits and provided Medicaid to the unemployed and
201. Children who are receiving SSI are not eligible for AFDC. H.R. 4 states that a
"qualifying child" shall be considered to be an SSI recipient, and therefore eligible to
receive Medicaid, even if the child is not receiving any SSI block grant services. Id. at
§ 1645(b)(2).
202. Id. at § 1644.
203. Id.
204. Id. at § 1643(1)-(3).
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poor, including the disabled.20 5 Although Michigan purged some
82,000 people from the GPA rolls overnight, 206 it concluded that it
could not justify eliminating benefits for the severely disabled. It
therefore created a new entitlements program-the State Disabil-
ity Assistance program ("SDA")-for this population, continuing
Medicaid and a small monthly stipend.20 7 Maryland also scaled
back its General Public Assistance program in 1992, but retained a
renamed component, the Disability and Assistance Loan Program
("DALP"), providing $157/month loans and outpatient medical
care to disabled persons, primarily to bridge the gap while an SSI
application is in process.20 8 The District of Columbia retained an
entitlement program for the totally disabled when it eliminated the
temporarily incapacitated from its General Public Assistance rolls
in July 1991.209 In short, even in the worst of times, governments
maintain programs for the some of disabled.
B. SSI Should Be Retained as a Federal Entitlement Program
SSI should remain a federally-funded and federally-administered
program. Congress has already experimented with block grants to
the states and the experiment did not work, thus creating the in-
centive to establish a uniform federal program in 1972. Prior to the
1972 SSI enabling legislation, Congress gave states matching grants
to encourage them to adopt means-tested support programs for the
elderly, blind and disabled. The result was "1300 separate state
and local programs with differing eligibility requirements and pay-
ment levels, including some with very low benefit amounts. Other
programs had specific eligibility requirements that discouraged
205. Telephone Interview with Clifford Weisberg, Esq., Center for Social Security
Rights, in Southfield, Michigan (Jan. 9, 1995).
206. Id.
207. Id. The monthly SDA stipend is $246. Even with SDA, 25% of the former
recipients of public assistance became homeless within a year, according to a 1992
University of Michigan study. Terry M. Neal, Welfare Program for Disabled Big Tar-
get of Glendening's Ax, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1995, at B1, B5.
208. Neal, supra note 207, at B5. The new Democratic Governor, Parris Glenden-
ing, proposed eliminating DALP as a "$48 million Maryland-only welfare program...
we can no longer afford." Id. DALP serves 21,000 Marylanders; supporters estimate
that elimination of DALP would put a minimum of 5500 disabled people on the
street. Id. (citing Jeff Singer, Baltimore Health Care for the Homeless).
209. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-205.42a (1994). The District adopted disability standards
identical to the SSA's. Id. at § 3-205.42(2) (1994). Again, the program is intended to
supply interim aid while the disabled person applies for SSI. Recipients sign Interim
Assistance Agreements with the District that they will repay the District for any peri-
ods of duplicate benefits when they receive their SSI lump sum back awards.
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needy persons from seeking assistance. ' 210 Congress replaced this
hodgepodge with a uniform federal program that would guarantee
an income floor to impoverished elderly and disabled people who
met a uniform standard, as well as support recipients in rehabilita-
tion and help them to return to the workforce. By coordinating the
SSI program with Title II Social Security, Medicaid and food pro-
grams, the federally-administered program was more efficient and
cheaper than 1300 separate state programs.
Capping expenditures in a program that already provides sup-
port at only 75% of the poverty guidelines would mean that gov-
ernment is prepared to watch a great many citizens slip further into
destitution. Further, setting a cap based on current funding ignores
the fact that vast numbers of currently eligible impoverished peo-
ple have not applied for benefits and are not now enrolled in the
SSI program. Government cannot predict how many persons will
be unable to support themselves in a given year because of their
disabilities. Nor can government or individuals control the dis-
abled person's place in line to receive a limited number of awards.
If they meet the criteria for benefits, the disabled who apply after
funds are expended are as deserving and as needy as those who
applied first. Therefore, neither funding caps on a federally-admin-
istered program nor block grants to the states makes sense or is
fair. 211 The proposal to limit children's SSI to vouchers for serv-
ices, but with no assurance that any particular qualifying child will
receive services, supports this contention.
Proponents of returning welfare to the states do not cite any evi-
dence to show that history will not simply repeat itself, and that
once again the nation would have a fragmented and unfair re-
sponse to the needs of the most vulnerable. One notion behind the
210. Statement of Ethel Zelenske, Staff Att'y, Nat'l Sr. Citizens Law Center,
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources, Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House
of Representatives at 2 (Jan. 17, 1995) (citing Trout & Mattson, A 10-Year Review of
the Supplemental Security Income Program, 47 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3 (Jan. 1984)).
211. As introduced in the House, The Personal Responsibility Act capped federal
spending for the entire SSI program; as enacted by the House on March 24th, only the
children's disability program would be capped and responsibility for dispensing bene-
fits transferred to the states as a block grant program. H.R. 4 § 602(b). At the Janu-
ary meeting of the National Governors' Association, a bipartisan working group of
governors introduced a proposal to allow states to choose between retaining the cur-
rent federally-guaranteed entitlements programs, but with guarantees of additional
flexibility to the states, or receiving federal block grants. A group of Republican gov-
ernors favored instructing Congress to end entitlements in favor of block grants. The
governors were unable to reach agreement on a position. Judith Havemann & Dan
Balz, Governors Seek Common Ground on Welfare Reform, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
1995, at A4.
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proposals is "to create a kind of welfare reform marketplace,
where states compete to develop the most efficient and innovative
program and have the flexibility to design welfare policies to their
own requirements. '212 The result, however, may not be creative
experimentation, but more likely "a race to the bottom. ' 213 The
National Governors' Association has criticized the House legisla-
tion precisely because it does not, in fact, promote state flexibility,
but imposes "prescriptive federal standards" and "represent[s] a
substantial and unacceptable cost shift to states. 2
14
C. Funds Should Go to the Disabled, Not to Creating New
State Infrastructures
One of the primary selling points for federalizing welfare for the
disabled, aged and blind in 1972 was that the SSA would assume
100% of the burden of administering the program.215 Today, states
are largely out of the business of determining disability. Shifting
responsibility for SSI to the states would result in increased, costly
state and local bureaucracy, draining scarce dollars from the people
the program is intended to help.216 The House version of the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act narrowly avoided transferring the entire
SSI program to the states. If such a transfer were to take place,
taxpayers would bear a double burden to maintain two infrastruc-
212. Malcolm Gladwell, Remaking Welfare: In States' Experiments, a Cutting Con-.
test, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at Al, A4.
213. Id. at A4 (quoting Paul Peterson, Harvard Univ.). Peterson notes that eco-
nomic theory does not support the notion that state experiments with' redistributive
policy will result in beneficial competition, because "the efficient way to keep costs
down is to keep the poor from coming into your state. What you have then is a race
to the bottom." Id.
214. Letter from Governors Dean, Thompson, Carper, Engler, Carnahan and Carl-
son on behalf of the National Governors' Ass'n to Representative Bill Archer, Chair,
House Comm. on Ways & Means at 1-2, 4 (Feb. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
215. See Conference Report on H.R. 1, Social Security Act Amendment, CONG.
REC. H36,914, 16-17 (Oct. 17, 1972). Although the medical determination of disabil-
ity is made by state agencies, SSA pays 100% of the costs of these agencies and
furnishes 100% of the administrative structure for their work.
216. Studies of states that have passed welfare reform measures show that the pro-
grains are, indeed, saving states millions of dollars, but that administrative costs have
soared. Judith Havemann, Red Tape May Snarl Turnover of Welfare, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 1995, at A4 (citing study by Lawrence M. Mead, Visiting Prof., Woodrow
Wilson Sch. of Int'l Affairs, Princeton Univ., showing that Wisconsin administrative
costs have risen by 72% since welfare reform, while direct payments to clients have
fallen; citing also Michigan figures showing the state spent $46 million more on ad-
ministration in 1994, after terminating state welfare, than in previous year, but overall
saved money); see also Editorial, More Overkill on Welfare Reform, WASH. POST, Feb.
16, 1995, at A22 (opposing proposal to reduce and limit cash grants in favor of
voucher system with high level of government involvement).
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tures-a federal agency to determine disability claims under Title
II of the Social Security Act, and a state agency to determine disa-
bility claims for poor people not covered by the Act.z17 Currently,
the federal government bears all the costs and burdens of disability
determination under both programs.
There is a near-total absence of an infrastructure in the states to
administer block grant disability programs in place of the existing
SSA program. In the District of Columbia, for example, which has
maintained a General Public Assistance program for the totally
and permanently disabled, largely as a transition program to assist
people while they wind their way through the tortuous SSI process,
the District employs only two medical examiners to evaluate disa-
bility and Medicaid claims and only one hearing officer to deter-
mine appeals. 18 If the approximately 16,000 D.C. residents now
receiving SSI disability payments219 and their successors 220 sud-
denly became the responsibility of the District, the District would
have to increase its welfare infrastructure and attendant costs dra-
matically. The same would be true in other states.221
But even if Congress does not effect a wholesale transfer of SSI
to the states, the House-enacted bill does transfer responsibility
and discretion to the states to administer a voucher program for
disability-related services to children. This would require states to
set up bureaucracies to identify relevant services, process applica-
tions from children to have access to services, monitor whether all
other sources have been exhausted before providing a service, and
adjudicate which children should receive a service, from whom,
and for how long. All these decisions are now made by families
who use the cash benefits they receive to meet the priorities they
identify, whether it is food and shelter, or a motorized wheelchair,
or a home health aide, or a contractor to install ramp access to the
child's home. If states are forced to assume these duties, far too
217. The federal government would have to keep its infrastructure intact because of
its responsibility to insured workers who file for benefits under Title II when they
become disabled. Giving disability welfare back to the states means that the taxpay-
ers will pay for two, instead of one, administrative infrastructure.
218. Interview with Holloway Wooten, Chief, D.C. Office of Fair Hearings (Feb. 1,
1995).
219. The most recent statistical report states that 15,805 D.C. residents received.SSI
disability payments in June 1994. 57 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 129, tbl. 2.A9 (Fall 1994).
220. In 1993, SSA awarded SSI benefits to 2082 disabled adults and 535 disabled
children in the District of Columbia. Soc. SECURITY BULL., ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT 1994, tbl. 7.B9.
221. See 57 Soc. SECURITY BULL. (Fall 1994) and Soc. SECURITY BULL., ANNUAL
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 1994 for state-by-state data.
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many dollars will go into creating a bureaucracy, rather than to
assisting children. Delays and unfairness seem inevitable. The
House bill is unlikely to foster state experimentation, since the
block grants are hedged with so many restrictions.
D. Limiting Benefits to Particular Groups at This ime Is Poor
Public Policy222
Children would not seem a likely target for cutting welfare
spending, but the dramatic rise in numbers of children receiving
SSI in recent years has drawn Congressional attention.223 Thus, the
103rd Congress appointed a Commission on Childhood Disability
to study and make recommendations on the appropriateness of
changing the current children's SSI program.224 The Chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee also asked a prestigious
nonprofit group to research and report on more general questions
of disability policy. 225 H.R. 4, however, would preempt those
processes.
The policy choice to end cash benefits to children was based on
an interest in reducing federal spending, and on anecdotal evidence
of "coaching" resulting in awards of benefits to undeserving chil-
dren (sometimes several children in a family).226 The notion that
impoverished families with the added responsibilities of caring for
a disabled child do not need cash for food, shelter and clothing
seems ludicrous; nevertheless, the proposal passed the House of
Representatives, and therefore must be taken seriously. Even if
222. The issues and public policy questions regarding government's role in
providing subsistence benefits differ for each of the groups of persons-children,
substance abusers and legal aliens-identified by the House bill. A variety of voices
oppose and defend the limitations. The testimony at Congressional hearings is a good
starting place for the reader who wishes to explore the issues further. A full
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
223. H.R. REP. No. 81, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 at 49 (The Welfare Transforma-
tion Act of 1995, H.R. 1157) (Mar. 15, 1995) (noting that the number of children on
SSI grew from 300,000 to 900,000 between 1989 and 1994, that spending increased
from $1.2 billion to $4 billion and that "[t]he SSI program is out of control").
224. Commission on Childhood Disability, supra note 174.
225. NASI, supra note 17.
226. H.R. REP. No. 81, supra note 223, at 49 (noting testimony that cash payments
induce some families with children who are not severely disabled to apply for SSI, and
further noting "reports of 'coaching' on the part of parents and generally broadened
eligibility criteria resulting in a program characterized by explosive growth in enroll-
ment and also mounting costs to taxpayers"). GAO, however, testified recently that
there was "limited empirical data" on either coaching or children's disability fraud,
but that "widespread media reports have weakened public confidence in the integrity
of the SSI program." Testimony of Jane L. Ross, Director, GAO Income Security
Issues, Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging at 10-11 (Mar. 2, 1995).
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the concerns that prompted the proposal were accurate, the re-
sponse is overbroad. Rather than terminating cash benefits to all
disabled children, Congress should enact two more narrowly tai-
lored responses. First, identify and punish those who defraud the
government. Second, amend the Social Security Act to provide for
a graduated benefit to families where more than one child is dis-
abled. The latter makes sense because subsistence benefits cover
costs, such as rent, that are shared among family members.
State governments are rightly concerned about the House bill.
The National Governors' Association, which opposes the House
bill's prohibitions on paying cash benefits to children, legal aliens
and substance abusers, has framed another line of public policy
argument focusing on the substantial cost shift from the federal to
the state governments. 227 The Governors' Association notes that
states would remain legally responsible to make their services
available to legal immigrants, whether or not the federal govern-
ment eliminates their eligibility for SSI. Furthermore, if large
numbers of persons are eliminated from SSI, as they would be
under the House bill, then the need for aid from the proposed
block grant programs to assist needy families with dependent chil-
dren will grow exponentially at the very time that funds for AFDC
would be capped. The Governors therefore urged Congress to
keep the children's SSI program intact, at least until it receives the
report of the Commission on Childhood Disability.228 The Gover-
nors also urged Congress not to re-legislate in the area of drug
abuse and alcoholism, but rather to allow the 103rd Congress's
amendments to be implemented.229
One would expect the Governors' Association opposition to as-
pects of the Personal Responsibility Act to be effective. One
would also expect the Senate to resist the House proposal on the
ground that "reforms" such as eliminating cash benefits for chil-
dren do not have a reasoned, empirically sound basis, and that pro-
posals of this magnitude should await the reports and
recommendations of Congressionally-appointed groups which are
due to report to Congress before the close of 1995.
227. Nat'l Governors Ass'n Letter, supra note 214, at 4.
228. Id. at 4.
229. Id. at 5. See supra notes 194-95.
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E. Current Legislative Proposals Ignore the Identified Need for
Procedural Reform
The various versions of the Personal Responsibility Act not only
ignore the history surrounding the enactment of SSI in 1972, but
also ignore the studies and proposals for reform that are ripe for
implementation. The bills do, indeed, promote the primary one-
line goal stated in the Contract With America: cut welfare spend-
ing. That approach, however, eliminates responsibility for social
service, rather than, as the Social Security Administration pro-
poses, providing a humane and critically important social service
more efficiently.
Thus, the legislative proposals would "reform" welfare only in
the sense that they would limit it, terminating benefits for many
and diminishing the financial support for children. The legislation
would cause more disabled people to slip further into poverty. To
the extent that parts of the SSI program are turned over to the
states, the legislation would require new state infrastructures.
These results are not in the public interest. Although the disability
determination process clearly needs reform, the Supplemental Se-
curity Income- program should survive the Contract With America.
V. Conclusion
Disabled persons who are without resources are caught in cross
currents. National policy, embodied most recently in the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, mandates a society that accommodates
the disabled in the workplace. So far, however, national policy
does not ensure health care for all. Medical insurance is only guar-
anteed for working-age persons when they are unable to work be-
cause of their disabilities. On account of this limitation,
government can be said to provide an incentive for disabled per-
sons in need of health care to take themselves out of the work
force. If Congress truly wants to encourage work over welfare, and
wants to reduce the costs of the SSI program, it would do well to
turn its attention first to the complex interrelationships that health
insurance and other factors bear to disability and self-sufficiency.
The inevitable consequences of precipitously dismantling the SSI
program are increased individual suffering and social costs. This
Article has argued that Supplemental Security Income should re-
main a federal entitlement program, and that procedural reform
should move forward, prior to Congress's or the SSA implementa-
tion of massive substantive changes in the disability program. The
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agency's comprehensive plan for procedural reform promises to
remedy many of the egregious program deficiencies that currently
characterize the vast enterprise of disability determination. In
times when the "safety net" was woven out of many programs,
there was less urgency to enroll qualifying individuals in SSI, and
many social and legal services providers were not deeply involved
in legislative and regulatory developments affecting social security,
Supplemental Security Income, and, in particular, the disability de-
termination process. This Article urges a broader participation by
advocates in shaping the debate and crafting solutions to identified
problems. A unified, redesigned, cost-efficient and effective sys-
tem for determining eligibility for federal financial support to very
poor disabled persons is an essential part of our social fabric.
